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Judging Immigration Equity:
Deportation and Proportionality in
the Supreme Court
Jason A. Cade*
Though it has not directly said so, the United States Supreme Court
cares about proportionality in the deportation system. Or at least it thinks
someone in the system should be considering the justifiability of removal
decisions. As this Article demonstrates, the Court’s jurisprudence across a
range of substantive and procedural challenges over the last fifteen years
increases or preserves structural opportunities for equitable balancing at
multiple levels in the deportation process. Notably, the Court has endorsed
decision makers’ consideration of the normative justifiability of
deportation even where noncitizens have a criminal history or lack a
formal path to lawful status. This proportionality-based lens helps unify
the Court’s seemingly disparate decisions regulating the immigration
enforcement system in recent years. It also has implications for deferred
action enforcement programs such as the DACA program implemented by
President Obama in 2012. The Court’s general gravitation toward
proportionality analysis in this field is sound. Nevertheless, there are
drawbacks to the Court’s approach, and the cases are probably best seen
as signals to the political branches that the deportation system remains in
dire need of wide-ranging reform.

* Copyright © 2017 Jason A. Cade. Assistant Professor, University of Georgia
Law School. For insightful comments at various stages of this project, I particularly
thank Dan Coenen, Hiroshi Motomura, and Usha Rodrigues. I am also grateful to
Muneer Ahmad, Jennifer Chacón, Nathan Chapman, Jennifer Koh, Kevin Lapp, Brian
Lea, David Rubenstein, and participants at the Emerging Immigration Scholars
Conference at the University of Miami Law School, the Clinical Law Writers
Workshop at NYU Law School, and the UGA Law Junior Faculty Retreat. Adrian
Pandev, “Joey” Wai Shan Fong, Olga Gambini, and Michael Sofo provided excellent
research assistance. Thanks to Dean Peter “Bo” Rutledge and the University of Georgia
for generous research support.

1029

1030

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:1029

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1031
I. HARSH LAW AND EQUITABLE DELEGATION ............................. 1036
II. STRUCTURING DEPORTATION DISCRETION IN THE MODERN
SYSTEM ................................................................................... 1041
A. Federal (Non-)Enforcement Discretion ............................ 1042
B. Equitable Considerations in Cases Involving Criminal
History ............................................................................ 1049
1. Making Deals ............................................................ 1050
2. Preserving Deals and Discretion .............................. 1060
C. Arbitrary and Capricious Charging Discretion ................ 1071
D. The Second-Look Cases ................................................... 1075
E. Prolonged Detention ........................................................ 1082
III. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS ............................................ 1093
A. Crime and Status ............................................................. 1095
B. Categorical (Non-)Enforcement Discretion? .................... 1100
C. Surrogates and Signals .................................................... 1103
CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 1107

2017]

Judging Immigration Equity

1031

“It’s because you give [the deportation statute] such a broad
construction that you get the . . . unusual situation . . . that the
State thinks it’s a very minor offense and yet it can become so
significant that the person’s deported.”
— Chief Justice John Roberts1
“Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it
makes sense to pursue removal at all. . . . Returning an alien to
his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he
has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria
for admission.”
— Justice Anthony Kennedy2
INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2016, a deadlocked Supreme Court failed to reach a
decision in United States v. Texas, which presented a challenge brought
by twenty-six states to enjoin Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), an Obama
administration program intended to extend discretionary deferral of
removal to millions of undocumented residents in the United States.3
The Court’s unsigned one-line opinion is without precedential effect
but had the consequence of affirming the lower court judgment, which
preliminarily enjoined the Obama initiative. The Court then denied
the administration’s motion for rehearing before a full Supreme Court,
returning the case to the district court for full consideration on the
merits of the injunction.4 After the November 2016 election of Donald
Trump, Department of Justice officials, together with lawyers for the
twenty-six states, submitted a joint motion asking the district judge to
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Mellouli v. Holder, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015)
(No. 13-1034), 2015 WL 2399380.
2 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
3 See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); see also United States v.
Texas, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, No. 15-674, 2016 WL 207257
(U.S. Jan. 19, 2016); RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DEFERRED ACTION
FOR UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT PARENTS: ANALYSIS OF DAPA’S POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON
FAMILIES AND CHILDREN 1 (2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deferredaction-unauthorized-immigrant-parents-analysis-dapas-potential-effects-families
(estimating that 3.3 million undocumented noncitizens might have benefited from
DAPA, impacting 4.3 million children and 2.3 million other adults residing in the
noncitizens’ households).
4 Petition for Rehearing, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15674), 2016 WL 3902439, reh’g denied, 2016 WL 5640497 (Oct. 3, 2016).
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stay the litigation until after the new administration determines how it
wishes to proceed.5 It is anticipated that President-elect Trump will
not pursue DAPA, and will also discontinue Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a similar executive policy implemented
in 2012. As of this writing, however, related litigation continues to
percolate in other Circuits.6
Whether or not the Texas litigation continues, the initiatives at issue
in that case raise fundamental questions about the scope of the
executive branch’s discretionary authority to decline to enforce
removal provisions against certain noncitizens whose mitigating
equities have been determined to outweigh the gravity of their
immigration offenses.7 Is it permissible (or desirable) for immigration
officials to consider factors such as family connections, length of
residence, and contributions to this country when making
enforcement or removal decisions, even where code law provides the
noncitizen no formal avenue for relief? Is it permissible (or desirable)
for executive policy-makers to establish standards that mandate the
exercise of equitable discretion, including when millions of deportable
noncitizens might be able to satisfy them? Should the immigration
status of the subject of potential enforcement be evaluated in
5 See Josh Gerstein, Citing Trump Win, Feds Move to Put Immigration Suit on Ice,
POLITICO (Nov. 18, 2016).
6 See, e.g., Complaint, Vidal v. Baran, No. 1:16-cv-04756 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25,
2016) (challenging nationwide scope of Judge Hanen’s preliminary injunction in the
DACA/DAPA litigation); Complaint, Lopez v. Richardson, No. 1:16-cv-09670 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 12, 2016) (same).
7 To be sure, even if Texas or related litigation eventually reaches the Court again,
the Justices might never reach the substantive questions at the heart of the case. The case
raises thorny standing and procedural issues that offer courts a number of exit points. See,
e.g., Michael Kagan, Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle Behind Pres.
Obama’s Immigration Actions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 665, 693-94 (2016) (discussing whether
the deferred action programs constitute binding rules requiring use of the Administrative
Procedures Act’s notice and comment provisions); Anne Egeler, Symposium: Unable to
Show Harm, Can Texas Employ the Court as a Political Referee?, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 8,
2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/symposium-unable-to-show-harm-can-texasemploy-the-court-as-a-political-referee/ (discussing standing issues in the case); Marty
Lederman, Two More Reasons Why the “Take Care” Argument in the DAPA Case Is a NonIssue, BALKANIZATION (Jan. 20, 2016, 1:47 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/01/twomore-reasons-why-take-care-argument.html (explaining why the Court was unlikely to
reach the constitutional question in the case no matter which side prevails); Leticia
Saucedo, On-Line Symposium on Texas v. United States: Employment Authorization, the
DAPA Memo and the Fifth Circuit’s Opinion, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Nov. 15, 2015),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/11/in-line-symposium-on-texasv-united-states-employment-authorization-the-dapa-memo-and-the-fifth-circ.html
(discussing the intersection between DAPA and preexisting regulations permitting grants
of employment authorization to persons with deferred action).
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discretionary decisions? These are complex concerns about the
salience and scope of equity and proportionality in the context of the
modern day deportation system. Such concerns are of vital importance
to policy-makers, jurists, and advocates as the nation continues to
grapple with contentious immigration issues.
Texas was by no means the only case to reach the Court in recent
years implicating the proportionality of the deportation system.
Indeed, this Article aims to show that the Court has become
increasingly troubled by the harsh and inflexible deportation rules
enacted by Congress in the 1990s. Across a range of procedural and
substantive law, the Court has issued decisions that endeavor to
structure the exercise of deportation discretion in both criminal and
administrative courts, in ways that encourage the possibility of
equitable balancing and that constrain some of the most onerous
applications of criminal removal provisions. What appears to underlie
this jurisprudence, though never explicitly acknowledged by the
Court, is a proportionality norm. The Court has not purported to
engage in substantive proportionality review, and its decisions do not
expressly make use of the term proportionality.8 But its procedural
and structural rulings in this area unmistakably promote consideration
of noncitizens’ mitigating characteristics before the life-altering
sanction of deportation is imposed. This Article looks at the Court’s
deportation rulings holistically, drawing attention to the common
themes in this emerging proportionality-influenced jurisprudence as
well as the limitations of the Court’s approach.
Part I of the Article offers a brief overview of changes made to the
immigration code in the 1990s, thus providing necessary context for
recent executive actions and Court decisions in this area. Part II turns
to those decisions. First, Part II.A explains how in Arizona v. United
States9 the Court came to grips with the critical role that prosecutorial
discretion plays in setting deportation policy. As the Court
acknowledged, enforcement choices, rather than adjudicative
decisions by immigration judges, are now the primary locus of
decisions about priorities and fairness in the administration of
deportation rules.10 Significantly, the Court tied much of its analysis in
8 However, while the Court’s decisions primarily concern procedural rulings,
several have a substantive effect, curbing the harshest applications of criminal removal
statutes. See infra Parts II.B, III.B.
9 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
10 See also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (acknowledging that
prosecutorial discretion in criminal courts critically influences immigration court
outcomes).
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Arizona to a perceived need to protect executive decisions not to
enforce immigration law against certain removable noncitizens from
state interference. Viewing Arizona through the lens of proportionality
helps to reconcile the Court’s separate preemption rulings in that case,
and it does so in a way that may have an advantage over the EqualProtection-based rationale put forward by other commentators.11
The remainder of Part II demonstrates that, while Arizona
consolidated discretionary enforcement power in the federal
government, another large body of the Court’s recent immigration
decisions has limited and shaped executive authority in ways that
promote the possibility that a noncitizen’s equities and infractions will
be weighed before deportation is imposed. Part II.B explains how one
set of decisions (most notably, Padilla v. Kentucky) increases
opportunities for criminal court outcomes that account for the
justifiability of deportation in individual cases, while the Court’s
categorical approach rulings operate to preserve criminal court deals
that benefit noncitizens in subsequent removal proceedings. Part II.C
discusses Judulang v. Holder,12 a case that, while unusual, may presage
further judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial charging practices in
immigration court, at least to the extent that those decisions arbitrarily
foreclose discretionary relief from removal. Part II.D turns to yet
another group of decisions recognizing procedural rights to reopen
deportation proceedings and to seek judicial review. Since 2008, the
Court has taken numerous cases in which noncitizens sought to
reopen a removal order to present a claimed right to remain. While
these decisions do not directly consider proportionality qua
proportionality — i.e., the ratio between the sanction of deportation
and the nature of the offense — they raise equity concerns more
generally, implicating access to statute-based forms of relief and the
quality of immigrant representation in removal proceedings.
Rounding out the survey, Part II.E discusses the Court’s recent
decisions concerning immigration detention, including a pending
blockbuster case that the Court will decide this term, Jennings v.
Rodriguez.13 Because the Court’s jurisprudence in this area has been
mixed, the state of the law regarding executive authority to detain
11 See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2014); Jennifer M.
Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
577 (2012) [hereinafter Immigration Federalism]; Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten
Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2013).
12 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
13 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (granting petition for certiorari).
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during removal proceedings has been in flux since 2001. But
noncitizens facing prolonged detention are already in a stronger
position than in previous decades, and, if the Court upholds the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez,14 many more noncitizens will have the
opportunity to secure release during immigration proceedings, thereby
enabling opportunities to present stronger legal and equitable defenses
to deportation.
Part III turns to the implications, as well as the limitations, of the
Court’s newfound proportionality-based scrutiny in this area. Part
III.A draws attention to the significant fact that the Court has emerged
as the sole federal branch concerned with the value of individual
evaluation of the justifiability of deportation in cases involving
noncitizens with criminal history. The Court also has recognized the
possibility that removals can be disproportionate for undocumented
noncitizens who have no apparent means of adjusting their status
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) — a point that
suggests that executive branch officials could eventually prevail if
large-scale non-enforcement initiatives return to the Court. Together,
the Court’s deportation decisions create or reinforce structural rules
supporting the possibility of equitable balancing for both criminal
offenders and the undocumented, in multiple stages of the removal
process. Recognizing the proportionality norm that drives all of this
jurisprudence helps to explain and reconcile the modern Court’s
deportation-related rulings in a wide variety of contexts.15
Part III.B considers the implications of this analysis for deferred
action programs such as those initiated by President Obama. While
the DACA and DAPA programs reflected the administration’s
proportionality concerns about particularly unjust applications of the
immigration code, their size and largely categorical nature gave rise to
controversy and legal uncertainty. Although ultimately side-stepping
the issue of their constitutionality, this Part argues that the programs
aligned with the equity-driven thrust of the Court’s recent
jurisprudence, and in particular, Arizona. Significantly, the vast
majority of noncitizens protected from state action by the Court’s
14 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
15 Cf.
David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration
Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 25) (on file
with the author) (“Missing from the literature, however, is an organizing meta-theory
for how to sort exceptional and mainstream doctrines within and across constitutional
dimensions, and to explain why immigration should be exceptional for some purposes
but not for others.”).
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preemption findings in that case will have escaped federal enforcement
as a consequence of macro-level enforcement and resource-allocation
choices, rather than any case-by-case equitable balancing in individual
cases. As such, Arizona helps lay some precedent for judicial validation
of future administrative efforts to implement proportionality-driven
non-enforcement efforts on a large scale.
Finally, Part III.C turns to the limitations of the Court’s efforts thus
far to ensure that the immigration system operates in a consistently
just manner. Of particular importance, nearly all of these cases have
been decided — unsurprisingly — on subconstitutional grounds.16
Nor is the Court likely to endorse a constitutionally grounded
substantive proportionality right in the removal context anytime
soon.17 As a result, a future administration could enforce immigration
laws with less regard for proportionality, and Congress could create an
even harsher and more rigid system. The Court’s decisions in this area
are perhaps best seen as signals — to lower courts, but especially to
the political branches — that specific aspects of the deportation
system are in dire need of reevaluation and reform.
I.

HARSH LAW AND EQUITABLE DELEGATION

Towards the end of the twentieth century, Congress set into motion
a radical transformation of immigration law in the United States.
Extensive statutory changes to the immigration code made all
unauthorized presence a deportable offense while vastly increasing the
number of noncitizens — including lawful permanent residents
(“LPRs”) — subject to deportation and barred from lawful return on
the basis of criminal history.18 At the same time, criminal sentencing
16 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 579
(1990) [hereinafter Phantom Constitutional Norms] (discussing the difference between
rulings decided on phantom, or subconstitutional, issues versus rulings decided on
constitutional issues). Although the primary mode of judicial reasoning in this area
involves statutory interpretation, the Court in fact decided several path-breaking
decisions on constitutional grounds in recent years. See infra Parts II.A and II.B
(discussing Arizona and Padilla).
17 See Josh Bowers, Plea-Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1083, 1090
(2016) [hereinafter Baselines] (“For the Court, inquiries into proportionality and
purpose are just too murky — too subjective and indeterminate . . . .”); Vicki C.
Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3096
(2015) (“The United States is often viewed as an outlier in this transnational embrace
of proportionality in constitutional law.”).
18 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
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judges and administrative immigration judges, formerly empowered to
balance the severity of deportation against the gravity of the
underlying offense and the noncitizen’s particular claim for leniency,
saw their equitable discretion eviscerated.19 As a result, petty
shoplifting, turnstile-jumping, minor marijuana offenses, and many
more minor crimes barely punishable under criminal laws now often
result in automatic (or nearly automatic) removal, together with
lengthy or permanent prohibition on lawful return.20
Amendments to the INA put in place at this time also greatly
expanded the use of immigration detention. Some of these provisions
permit authorities to seek the detention of anyone facing removal.21
Others mandate confinement, for example on the basis of criminal
history, including convictions for marijuana possession, petty theft, or
other minor offenses that in many cases have little or no relation to
the underlying assessment of risk that detention is intended to guard
against.22 The executive branch has vastly increased the number of
noncitizens it detains in the twenty years since Congress enacted these
detention rules. In 1996, about 6,600 persons were held in detention
on any given day.23 Now, that number has increased to over 34,000
immigration detainees per day, with over 400,000 detained each year
in 250 separate prisons and secure facilities.24
In short, the modern deportation system subjects many millions of
long-term noncitizens to detention and removal, with little
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 & 42 U.S.C.); see Jason A. Cade, Enforcing
Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 671-76 (2015) [hereinafter Enforcing
Immigration Equity]; Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 510-19 (2009) [hereinafter President and
Immigration].
19 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 676-78.
20 Id. at 673-75; see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 361 (2010) (describing how
changes to the immigration code made deportation an almost automatic consequence
of many criminal offenses).
21 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C § 1225(a), (b)(2)(A)
(2012) (requiring detention of noncitizens seeking admission who are “not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted”); id. § 1231(a)(2), (a)(6) (requiring detention
for up to 90 days following a removal order and authorizing continued detention
beyond that period on a discretionary basis).
22 See id. § 1226(c) (providing that immigration officials “shall take into custody
any alien who [is inadmissible or deportable on most criminal grounds] . . . when the
alien is released”).
23 INS: Deportations, Detention, MIGRATION NEWS (June 1998) http://migration.
ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1547.
24 See Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration
Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 365 (2014).
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opportunity for formal consideration of whether these severe sanctions
are justified in individual cases. And yet, the legislative constriction of
immigration judges’ authority to set aside removal has not removed all
consideration of fairness from the deportation system. As with
squeezing a balloon, the contraction of judicial authority to wield
equitable discretion has expanded the role of police and prosecutorial
discretion in evaluating and extending relief to noncitizens based on
their individual circumstances. This phenomenon is well understood
in criminal law, where prosecutors’ commitment to the just
application of the law has long been accepted as necessary to mitigate
the effect of overly broad, overly punitive, and inflexible penal
statutes.25 It seems that lawmakers increasingly rely on prosecutorial
discretion to ensure that criminal law is appropriately applied to
individual human beings.26
Likewise, in the immigration context, Congress’s expansion of the
grounds for removal coupled with its narrowing of adjudicative
authority to grant discretionary relief effectively, if not intentionally,
transferred substantial policy-making authority to enforcement
officials.27 To be sure, Congress has expressly delegated vast swaths of
authority to the executive branch to establish domestic immigration
enforcement priorities and to manage the admission of foreign
nationals fleeing persecution, upheaval, natural disasters, or other
humanitarian situations.28 But the space for executive policy-making
25 See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2010) [hereinafter Legal
Guilt]; Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008) [hereinafter The Arc of the Pendulum]; William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 570-71
(2001).
26 See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 154-57 (2007); Wayne LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United
States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 533 (1970); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1963 (1992) (arguing that legislators
intend that prosecutors will “exercise their discretion not to pursue habitual criminal
sentencing for offenders who [fall] within the statute but seemed not to deserve such
harsh treatment”).
27 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 679-81; Cox &
Rodríguez, President and Immigration, supra note 18, at 464; Stephen Lee, De Facto
Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 553-54 (2013); Hiroshi Motomura, The
Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and
the Civil-Criminal Divide, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1820-21 (2011) [hereinafter The
Discretion that Matters].
28 See 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012) (charging the Secretary of Homeland Security with
“[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities”); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a) (2012) (conferring broad power to the Secretary of Homeland Security over
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power in this area also stems from “a profound mismatch between the
law on the books and the reality on the ground,” an incongruity
resulting from “a series of legal, political, and demographic
developments that have accelerated over the last four decades.”29
These developments include not only the INA’s blunderbuss removal
provisions, but also the longstanding acquiescence by both political
branches in the unauthorized migration and employment of
noncitizens.30
I have argued in previous work that Congress’s explicit and de facto
delegations of authority to the executive branch obligate immigration
officials to ensure that immigration laws are not enforced in an
arbitrary, discriminatory, or disproportionate manner.31 In Enforcing
“the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the
immigration and naturalization of aliens”); id. § 1254a(b)(1) (delegating the Attorney
General authority to designate countries in which natural disasters, war, or other
significant upheaval warrant granting “temporary protected status” to nationals of
those countries residing in the United States); id. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (delegating
authority to the Attorney General to “parole” inadmissible noncitizens into the
country for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit”); Refugee Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 102-03 (1980) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (giving the President authority to determine the
countries from which refugees would be admitted and the total number of refugee
admissions each year).
29 Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 131 (2015) [hereinafter Redux]; see also MOTOMURA, supra
note 11, at 19-55 (explaining the political and historical factors that contributed to the
size of the current unauthorized population and the connection with enforcement
discretion).
30 See MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 19-55; Cox & Rodriguez, Redux, supra note
29, at 147-49.
31 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 661 (offering a critical
assessment of the Obama administration’s efforts to administer deportation equitably);
Jason A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180, 187-98
(2013) [hereinafter Policing the Immigration Police] (arguing that the Executive bears
responsibility for ensuring that the Fourth Amendment is fully upheld in the
administration of immigration law whether or not judicially enforceable remedies for
constitutional violations are available); Jason A. Cade, Return of the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. ONLINE 25, 39 (2015), http://www.nyulawreview.org/online-features/return-jrad
[hereinafter Return of the JRAD] (arguing that immigration officials should rely on
pardons, expungements, and sentencing judges’ recommendations against deportation
as “disproportionality rules of thumb” when determining whether to pursue removal
against noncitizens with criminal history); Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing
Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2014) [hereinafter The
Challenge of Seeing Justice Done] (suggesting a range of administrative reforms to make
deportation hearings more accurate and fair); Jason A. Cade, The Plea Bargain Crisis
for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1812-13 (2013)
[hereinafter Plea Bargain Crisis] (arguing that the Executive should scale back

1040

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:1029

Immigration Equity, for example, I described the primary ways in
which the Department of Homeland Security implemented its
discretionary enforcement powers in immigration law under the
Obama administration.32 These measures include (1) focusing finite
resources on the apprehension and removal of recent border-crossers
and noncitizens who encounter criminal justice systems, (2) pushing
for increased use of prosecutorial discretion in individual deportation
cases, and (3) creating programs to administer discretion on a more
consistent basis for certain noncitizens.33
While these actions reflect serious (if not extraordinary) efforts to
administer deportation rules fairly, significant challenges hamper a
system that relies so heavily on enforcement discretion to remain
normatively justifiable.34 Central among these obstacles are (1) an
entrenched enforcement culture that treats almost any criminal history
as an irrefutable proxy for undesirability, (2) crushing workloads for
front-line operatives, who otherwise might be open to investigating
the mitigating details of individual deportation cases, and (3) political
pushback against the exercise of prosecutorial leniency.35 Enforcing
Immigration Equity proposed a range of legislative and administrative
reforms that might improve the existing system. Most importantly,
Congress could roll back the breadth of removal provisions and
restore a larger measure of equitable discretion to sentencing judges
and immigration judges.36 Additionally, it could enact limitations
periods prohibiting the use of very old convictions as the basis for
deportation.37 Congress could also strengthen certain procedural
protections that improve the accuracy and fairness of removalproceeding outcomes.38 And the Executive could undertake many
similar, if distinctly second-best, administrative reforms.39
Whether through legislative or administrative measures, Enforcing
Immigration Equity argued, “severe penalties imposed on the basis of
immigration enforcement measures targeting noncitizens facing only misdemeanor
charges in light of (1) such convictions’ general unreliability as evidence of wrongdoing and (2) corrosive feedback loops created by the federal immigration agency’s
integration with the misdemeanor system).
32 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 687-98.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 698-713.
35 Id. at 698-711; Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done, supra note 31, at 46-75.
36 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 714-17.
37 Id. at 715-16.
38 Id. at 717-18.
39 Id. at 719-23; Cade, Return of the JRAD, supra note 31, at 45-50; Cade, The
Challenge of Seeing Justice Done, supra note 31, at 61-65.
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criminal convictions must be predicated on considerations of
individualized justice.”40 Government decision makers — including
administrative agencies charged with meting out severe sanctions on a
large scale — should be, in Michael Lipsky’s words, “responsive to the
unique circumstances of individual transgressions.”41 My prior work
suggested that if the political branches do not take action to ensure the
deportation system’s commitment to proportionality and fairness,
pressure to intervene would come to bear on federal courts.42 As I
develop in Part II of this article, it appears that concerns about
disproportionate results have already motivated the Supreme Court to
make equity-driven adjustments to the removal system over the past
fifteen years, in a break from a long-standing policy of extreme
deference to the political branches.43
II.

STRUCTURING DEPORTATION DISCRETION IN THE MODERN SYSTEM

In this Part, I explain how key Supreme Court cases work to
promote and structure the exercise of discretion in the modern
deportation system. Across a diverse body of law, the modern Court
has endeavored to preserve, restore, or create opportunities for the
individual balancing of equities in deportation proceedings, including
for noncitizens who have a criminal history or who lack lawful
immigration status. For present purposes, the Court’s decisions fall
into five categories: (1) preserving federal discretionary enforcement
authority, (2) promoting equitable considerations in cases involving
noncitizens with criminal history, (3) curbing arbitrary and capricious
charging discretion, (4) safeguarding procedural rights to reopen
removal proceedings and to seek judicial review, and (5) regulating
immigration detention. In the main, this Part considers each set of
cases independently, although it also notes important overlaps and

40

Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 724.
MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES 15 (2010) (“[S]ociety seeks not only impartiality from its public
agencies but also compassion for special circumstances and flexibility in dealing with
them.”).
42 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 723-24.
43 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (“[A]ny policy
toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in
regard to the conduct of foreign relates, the war power, and the maintenance of a
republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the
political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724-30 (1893).
41
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interlocking connections. Part III will turn to the broader themes and
implications of the Court’s approach across the decisions.
A. Federal (Non-)Enforcement Discretion
In recent years, a number of states have passed laws attempting to
give state and local officials a larger role in enforcing restrictions on
the employment of noncitizens and other aspects of immigration
law.44 Some states have been transparent that the goal of such policies
is to deter the entry or continued presence of undocumented
noncitizens.45 The Obama administration brought lawsuits against
several of these states, including Arizona, endeavoring to invalidate
their subfederal immigration controls on preemption grounds.46 On
June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. United States,
which clarified the federal government’s primacy in this area, although
preserving some room for state activity.47 The Court struck down most
of the challenged provisions of Arizona’s omnibus law, which
essentially had created a state-level branch of the federal immigration
enforcement system. Most remarkable about Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion for the present inquiry is the degree to which it
recognizes that equity in the deportation scheme today depends
almost entirely on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.48 As a
result, the Court’s rulings in the case can be understood to structurally
insulate the executive’s ability to exercise its discretion so as to
administer deportation law in a normatively just manner.49
At the outset, Justice Kennedy observed that a “principle feature of
the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration
officials.”50 He then explicitly connected federal agencies’ exercise of
44 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-13-6 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051
(2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-100(b) (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-100 to -109
(2013).
45 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012) (noting that
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 establishes “an official state policy of ‘attrition through
enforcement,’” intended to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of
aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States”
(citations omitted)).
46 See Jeremy Pelofsky & James Vicini, Obama Administration Sues Arizona over
Immigration Law, REUTERS (July 6, 2010, 11:54 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-obama-immigration-lawsuit-idUSTRE6653Q320100707.
47 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492.
48 See id. at 2499.
49 See also Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 683-85 (analyzing
the federal government’s equity-based arguments in the Arizona litigation).
50 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 (emphasis added).
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prosecutorial discretion to the implementation of equity in the
deportation system:
Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it
makes sense to pursue removal at all. . . . Discretion in the
enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human
concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their
families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien
smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities
of an individual case may turn on many factors, including
whether the alien has children born in the United States, long
ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military
service. . . . Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed
inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense
or fails to meet the criteria for admission.51
This language is striking in its candor about the realities of the
modern immigration system. Prosecutorial discretion now plays a key
role in shaping deportation policy, due to the overwhelming size of
the potentially deportable population, the extraordinary breadth of the
INA’s removal provisions, and the dearth of opportunities for
discretionary relief from removal at the adjudicative stage of
proceedings.52 Justice Kennedy’s language acknowledges that not all
noncitizens made deportable by Congress are similarly situated and
that executive enforcement officials should weigh individual equities
in determining the appropriateness of removal in particular cases. This
stark endorsement of the central role of enforcement discretion in the
modern deportation scheme — including discretion not to pursue
persons who are formally removable — set the stage for the Court’s
preemption analysis of the challenged provisions of S.B. 1070.
Throughout its discussion of the challenged statutory provisions,
the Court explained its preemption rulings in light of the value of the
executive’s implementation of equity through control over
enforcement decisions. For example, in striking down section 3 of the
state law (which criminalized noncitizens’ failure to complete or carry
an alien registration document), the Court emphasized the risk posed
to the “integrated scheme” of regulation created by Congress, a
scheme that envisions broad federal control over enforcement

51

Id. at 2499 (emphasis added).
See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 9-13 (2015); supra Part I and
accompanying text.
52
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decisions.53 As stated by the Court: “Were § 3 to come into force, the
State would have the power to bring criminal charges against
individuals for violating a federal law even in circumstances where
federal officials in charge of the comprehensive scheme determine that
prosecution would frustrate federal policies.”54 In other words, the
Court was concerned that section 3 would enable state or local
authorities to negate the federal government’s determination not to
penalize certain removable individuals, whether resulting from caseby-case evaluation or macro-enforcement priorities.
Justice Kennedy’s analysis of section 6 of S.B. 1070, which would
have given state officers authority to make warrantless arrests of any
noncitizen whom the officer has probable cause to believe had
committed a removable offense, centered on the same theme. As he
explained:
By authorizing state officers to decide whether an alien should
be detained for being removable, § 6 violates the principle that
the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the
Federal Government. A decision on removability requires a
determination whether it is appropriate to allow a foreign
national to continue living in the United States.55
Here, too, the Court unabashedly recognized that the executive’s role
in setting deportation policy encompasses decisions not to enforce
laws against deportable noncitizens. The Court found worrisome the
possibility that state officers could subject noncitizens “whom federal
officials determine should not be removed” to “unnecessary
harassment.”56 To be sure, Congress has created opportunities for
non-federal cooperative immigration enforcement. Nevertheless,
emphasized Justice Kennedy, the scheme requires overarching
supervision by federal immigration officials in light of the “significant
complexities involved in enforcing federal immigration law.”57 Section
6, in contrast, would have given the state independent authority to
implement the immigration system’s most coercive and powerful tool
53

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2502.
Id. at 2503.
55 Id. at 2506 (citations omitted).
56 Id.
57 Id.; see also id. at 2507 (“There may be some ambiguity as to what constitutes
cooperation under the federal law; but no coherent understanding of the term would
incorporate the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest an alien for being
removable absent any request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal
Government.”).
54
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— detention — without regard to federal decisions not to target or
prosecute the detained individual. As the Court explained at the outset
of the opinion, the federal decisionmaking threatened by S.B. 1070,
and sections 3 and 6 in particular,58 “embraces immediate human
concerns” that may justify non-enforcement against even statutorily
removable noncitizens.59
In contrast, the one provision of S.B. 1070 that survived preemption
was perceived by the Court to aid, rather than threaten, the executive’s
ability to equitably implement deportation law. Section 2(B) mandates
that state officers make a reasonable attempt to determine the
immigration status of all persons who have been stopped, detained, or
arrested on some other legitimate basis, if the officer has reasonable
suspicion that the person is unlawfully present. Consultation and
information sharing about potential immigration-violators, the Court
observed, furthers Congress’s design of the modern deportation
system and does not interfere with federal control over the
implementation of immigration priorities.60 Unlike section 6, which
would have allowed Arizona authorities to unilaterally determine
immigration violations and detain on that basis alone, section 2(B)
does not supply any independent grounds for police to make or to
lengthen stops.
Scholars have questioned whether Section 2(B) might still give local
authorities outsized influence over federal immigration caseloads,
including through discriminatory policing tactics.61 Because these
scholars have suggested that equal-protection-based concerns
influenced, at least in part, the preemption rulings in Arizona, the
Court’s decision not to strike down section 2(B) is seen as a

58 The Court’s invalidation of section 5(C), criminalizing noncitizens who engage
in unauthorized employment, also reflected concern that the state law would threaten
the Executive’s ability to balance priorities in enforcement, although the Court tied
that aspect of its holding more directly to Congress’s considered decision not to
impose criminal penalties for unauthorized employment. See id. at 2505.
59 Id. at 2499.
60 Id. at 2508-09; see also id. at 2527 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“At bottom, the discretion that ultimately matters is not whether to verify a
person’s immigration status but whether to act once the person’s status is known. . . .
[T]he Federal Government retains the . . . discretion to enforce the law in particular
cases.”).
61 See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 130-42; Chacón, Immigration Federalism,
supra note 11, at 580 (“[I]n upholding Section 2(B), the Court left in place a provision
that was a source of deep concern for opponents of the law, and effectively greenlighted systematic state and local participation in immigration enforcement in a way
that failed to account for the inevitable discriminatory effects of such participation.”).
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contradiction or mistake.62 Perhaps so, but if the Court’s primary
concern
regarding
modern
immigration
enforcement
is
proportionality, rather than discrimination,63 then a state law aimed at
securing and sharing information about the whereabouts and activities
of noncitizens merely facilitates the federal executive’s ability to
establish and act on enforcement priorities.64 To be clear, I see no
reason to dispute the claim that state or federal laws such as section
2(B) increase the risk of discriminatory policing at the local level.65
Rather, the relevant point for present purposes is that the Court
closely tied its preemption analysis of each of the challenged
provisions in Arizona to its perception that the federal government
must retain broad discretion to decide “whether . . . to pursue removal
at all,”66 and recognizing the significance of this newfound
acknowledgement of the role of enforcement-driven proportionality in
the deportation system helps explain its preemption rulings.
The outcome of Arizona took many by surprise.67 Recent federal
case law in the immigration field had given state lawmakers reason to
believe their controls would survive on a “mirror image” theory. In
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, decided only a year before Arizona,
the Court upheld a different provision of Arizona’s law, which
required employers to use a federal database to check whether
62 See MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 130-42; Chacón, Immigration Federalism, supra
note 11, at 609-17; Guttentag, supra note 11, at 41 (“If immigrant equality were
acknowledged as a core value of federal law, evidence that Section 2B increases the
danger of profiling or discrimination would properly be part of the preemption
analysis rather than be marginalized as an entirely distinct claim.”).
63 At the outset of the Solicitor General’s oral argument in Arizona, Chief Justice
Roberts interjected: “Before you get into what the case is about, I’d like to clear up at
the outset what it’s not about. No part of your argument has to do with racial or ethnic
profiling, does it? I saw none of that in your brief. . . . So this is not a case about
ethnic profiling.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182).
64 Cf. Adam Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012
SUP. CT. REV. 31, 61-62 (2012).
65 Indeed, some of my previous work focuses on that very issue. See Cade, Policing
the Immigration Police, supra note 31.
66 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2499; see also id. at 2521 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“But to say, as the Court does, that Arizona contradicts federal law by
enforcing applications of the Immigration Act that the President declines to enforce
boggles the mind.” (emphasis in original)).
67 See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court 2009–13: A New Era of
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 87, 91 (2015) [hereinafter
Immigration in the Supreme Court] (noting that the result in Arizona v. United States
“surprised many observers who predicted that the conservative Roberts Court would
uphold the law in its entirety”).
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potential noncitizen employees are federally authorized to work, even
though federal law does not make use of the verification system
mandatory.68 In Arizona, however, the Court declined to employ the
states-can-mirror-federal-law reasoning, focusing instead on the need
to protect federal choices regarding prosecutorial discretion from
disruption.69
The Court’s expansive conception of preemption in Arizona has
both detractors and supporters within the legal academy.70 In Kevin
Johnson’s view, the Court’s approach was in line with other recent
preemption rulings.71 Other commentators have noted, however, that
Arizona does not conform to traditional preemption analysis.72 Adam
Cox, for example, observed that it is common for states to help
68 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). Arguably, however,
what really mattered in Whiting was the carve-out in the applicable federal law. IRCA,
while expressly preempting state employer sanctions, does allow states to use
“licensing and similar laws,” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012), which is what Arizona
had done with the state statute at issue. Cf. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court,
supra note 67, at 80-81 (“Whiting is a narrowly drawn decision dealing with the
interpretation and application of the language of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act. The Court carefully adhered to the plain meaning of the statute, which expressly
preserves state authority to exercise the licensing power to facilitate enforcement of
the employer sanctions provisions of the federal immigration law.”).
69 David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 81, 87 (2013) [hereinafter Immigration Structuralism] (noting that the “proffered
conflict was between executive policies that focus enforcement resources on targeted
subclasses of unlawfully present immigrants and Arizona’s arrest-and-report laws that
target a generic and undifferentiated class of undocumented immigrants”).
70 Compare David S. Rubenstein, Black-Box Immigration Federalism, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 983, 993-1004 (2016) (arguing that only the Constitution, statutes, and treaties
— not executive enforcement policies — can provide a constitutional basis to preempt
state laws), with MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 130-42 (arguing that preemption
analysis in immigration law necessarily involves a decision about the relative risk of
unconstitutional activity by enforcers, and defending the Arizona v. United States
decision on the ground that nonfederal actors are more like to violate constitutional
rights of noncitizens when enforcing federal immigration law), and Catherine Y. Kim,
Immigration Separation of Powers and the President’s Power to Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 691 (2014) (undertaking a functionalist defense of the preemption decisions in
Arizona v. United States, in light of the unique context of modern immigration law).
71 See Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 86-91
(describing the preemption rulings in Arizona v. United States as “unremarkable” and
citing, inter alia, Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387-88 (2000)
and Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)); see also Harlan G. Cohen,
Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
380, 406-08, 415-16, 438-39 (2015) (discussing connections between Crosby,
Garamendi, and Arizona v. United States).
72 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 64; David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1125 (2012).
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enforce federal laws.73 States regularly make arrests for violations of
federal criminal law, or attach state penalties to conduct proscribed by
federal law. The courts have typically viewed such “enforcement
redundancy” as acceptable and consonant with federal goals.74 The
result is that, in many areas of law enforcement, state efforts to
reinforce federal controls are constitutional.75
Whatever else might be said about this debate, the key point for
present purposes is that the Court in Arizona squarely recognized that
the enforcement stage is now the primary point at which equitable
discretion comes into play for the great majority of deportable
noncitizens.76 The Court’s decision preserved the primacy of federal
supervision of enforcement discretion, tying its reasoning to the
realities of a system characterized by staggeringly broad grounds of
deportability and abandonment of formal adjudicative discretion.
Importantly, the federal enforcement discretion preserved by the
Court in Arizona is not contingent upon immigration status. Instead,
the decision contemplates and endorses enforcement authorities’
consideration of the appropriateness of initiating proceedings against
any deportable noncitizen, including persons unlawfully present.77
As I develop further in Part III, however, it is crucial to recognize
that the Court’s ruling in Arizona falls far short of ensuring
proportionality, nondiscrimination, or rationality in the removal
system.78 Clearly, federal enforcement officials might fail to balance
equities or to enforce the law in a nondiscriminatory manner when
making removal decisions. Thus, Arizona merely preserves the
potential for targeted and sensible equity-based enforcement decisions
made at the federal level.79 That said, to the extent the Court wishes
73 See Cox, supra note 64, at 34-41; see also Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of
the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV.
253, 255 (2011).
74 See Cox, supra note 64, at 34-41.
75 See id. at 41-48.
76 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 44-45, Torres v. Lynch, No. 14-1096 (U.S.
Nov. 3, 2015), 2015 WL 9919328 (Chief Justice John Roberts suggesting that if the
aggravated felony category sweeps too broadly, “the attorney general may decide not
to subject the alien to removal in the first place, right?”).
77 See infra Part III.A (discussing the applicability of the Court’s deportation
rulings to undocumented noncitizens).
78 See infra Part III.C.
79 See MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 130-42 (defending the Arizona v. United States
decision for its implied recognition that nonfederal actors are more like to violate
constitutional rights of noncitizens when enforcing federal immigration law); Carrie
L. Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality Principles in Preemption Analysis of Sub-Federal
Immigration Laws: The California Trust Act, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 481, 523 (2015)
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for the legislature (or the judiciary, within institutional constraints) to
be able to further shape or regulate executive policy in immigration
law, that task is somewhat easier when the appropriate enforcement
body is centralized and federal, rather than a multitude of state and
local regulators.
B. Equitable Considerations in Cases Involving Criminal History
The centrality of criminal history in triggering deportation delegates
de facto power to screen for undesirable noncitizens to law
enforcement actors in the criminal justice system.80 Indeed, the
outcome of criminal proceedings determines not only whether a
noncitizen is removable, but also whether the person may be subject
to detention, foreclosed from seeking discretionary relief, or barred
from ever returning lawfully to the United States.81 The now almostautomatic linkage between these harsh consequences and a criminal
court conviction dramatically raises the stakes of choices made by
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and noncitizen defendants. While the
Obama administration appeared to recognize an obligation to enforce
deportation laws equitably,82 its enforcement agency deported more
noncitizens in eight years than at any other time in United States
history.83 The administration also largely declined to differentiate
among so-called “criminal aliens,” treating almost any kind of criminal
history as an “irrefutable signifier of undesirability in the modern
deportation system.”84 Recent rulings suggest that this aggressive
(“Federal exclusivity has the potential to prevent the erosion of anti-discrimination
principles resulting from increasing involvement of sub-federal agents in immigration
enforcement.”).
80 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 682-83; see also Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. at 365-66 (noting that many immigration consequences now
follow automatically from criminal convictions); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting
Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1350 (2010) (“With mandatory deportation
rules, the criminal prosecutor becomes the immigration screener.”); Ingrid V. Eagly,
Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV 1126, 1156-96 (2013) [hereinafter Criminal Justice for Noncitizens]; Lee,
supra note 27, at 572-77; Motomura, The Discretion that Matters, supra note 27, at
1852-53.
81 See supra Part I.
82 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 687-98 (explaining the
Obama administration’s targeted distribution of resources, prosecutorial discretion
initiatives, and categorical reprieves such as DACA and DAPA).
83 Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of
Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 58, 74 (2015)
[hereinafter Deferred Action].
84 Cade, Return of the JRAD, supra note 31, at 42-44; see also Cade, Enforcing
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approach to enforcement of the INA’s broad criminal law provisions
troubles a majority of the Supreme Court. As the following sections
explain, the Court has issued a series of decisions that reflect deep
concerns about inequitable deportations based on criminal history.85
1.

Making Deals

The Court’s discomfort with the punitive and inflexible turn that
immigration law took in the 1990s first surfaced in its 2001 decision
INS v. St. Cyr.86 Enrico St. Cyr was a Haitian citizen who became a
lawful permanent resident of the U.S. in 1986. St. Cyr pled guilty to
sale of a controlled substance, a few months before Congress installed
the modern immigration law structure by enacting the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA).87 The Court first had to decide an important procedural
question, which was whether Congress’s amendments to the INA in
1996 eliminated habeas corpus review. Employing the constitutional
avoidance canon to find such review still intact,88 the substantive
question before the Court was whether St. Cyr could seek the exercise
of remedial equitable discretion by an immigration judge pursuant to a
repealed provision of the INA, known as 212(c), because his
conviction had occurred before the repeal.89 In an opinion by Justice
Stevens, the Court observed that Congress’s broadening of the
deportation provisions in the early 1990s meant that an “extremely
large” number of noncitizens had relied on equitable adjudicative
relief in order to remain in the United States prior to the repeal of
212(c). Indeed, the Court observed that, “not surprisingly,” over half
of noncitizens’ applications for 212(c) relief had been granted by
immigration judges.90
Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 700-09; Jayesh Rathod, Crimmigration Creep:
Reframing Executive Action on Immigration, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 173, 173-74 (2015)
(arguing that DACA and DAPA criteria entrench a “significant misdemeanor” bar to
eligibility).
85 See infra Part III.A.
86 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
87 Id. at 289.
88 The Court found the absence of an alternative forum, coupled with the lack of
an unambiguous and express statement of congressional intent to preclude all habeas
review, counseled against a statutory construction that would raise serious
constitutional questions. Id. at 298-314.
89 Id. at 292-93.
90 Id. at 296.
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Addressing the government’s argument that the elimination of
212(c) applied retroactively to bar St. Cyr from seeking equitable
relief, the Court expressed unease with the contention that the
“[l]egislature’s unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled
expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration.”91 As
a result, the Court articulated and applied a presumption against
retroactive elimination of discretionary relief in favor of St. Cyr.92 The
Court held that Congress would need to provide an unambiguous,
clear statement if it intended that persons deportable on the basis of
convictions obtained before IIRIRA should be ineligible for the
balancing of equities that, before 1996, had long marked U.S.
deportation law.
The Court’s rulings in St. Cyr were controversial. The principle of
constitutional avoidance, for example, provided less than airtight
support for the Court’s decision on 212(c), because it had held many
times that the ex post facto clause does not apply in the civil
immigration context, leaving Congress free to make retroactivelooking changes to deportation law.93 Even so, background concerns
about discretionary justice carried the day for St. Cyr, as the majority
emphasized the unfairness of retroactively disadvantaging defendants
who might have pleaded guilty to certain crimes in reliance on the
possibility that section 212(c) could safeguard them from
deportation.94 Put simply, Justice Stevens’s opinion signaled the
Court’s emerging worries about the wooden and inhumane operation
of the modern-day immigration system. And these same concerns have
resurfaced in numerous immigration decisions issued in the wake of
St. Cyr.
Vartelas v. Holder, for example, involved another provision of
IIRIRA that changed the rules for Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs)
with past convictions.95 Historically, LPRs could travel abroad without
needing to apply for re-admission to the United States, so long as the
91 Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994)).
92 Id. at 315-16.
93 See, e.g., Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 38 (1990); Lehmann v. United
States, 353 U.S. 685, 690 (1957); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594-95 (1952).
94 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315, 320-25; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368
(2010) (“[W]e have recognized that ‘preserving the possibility of’ discretionary relief
from deportation under § 212(c) of the 1952 INA, repealed by Congress in 1996,
‘would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether
to accept a plea offer or instead proceed to trial.’”).
95 Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012).

1052

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:1029

excursion was “innocent, casual, and brief.”96 As amended in 1996,
however, the statute deems LPRs who travel abroad as presumptively
inadmissible if they fall into any of six categories.97 One of these
categories tracks the statutory grounds for criminal-based
inadmissibility, barring from readmission any permanent resident who
has committed, for example, a controlled substance offense, a crime
involving moral turpitude, or more than one conviction of any type.98
This amendment worked a significant change in the legal framework,
because the grounds of deportability are generally narrower than the
grounds of inadmissibility and because noncitizens seeking admission
have the burden to demonstrate admissibility, whereas the
government bears the burden when it seeks to deport an LPR.99
Panagis Vartelas had been a permanent resident for over 20 years
when he was put into removal proceedings upon return from a oneweek trip to Greece.100 Because Vartelas had a 1994 conviction for
conspiracy to counterfeit (a crime involving moral turpitude), an
immigration officer classified him as seeking admission.101 He was put
into removal proceedings, found inadmissible, and ordered
removed.102
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for a six-Justice majority highlighted
some of Vartelas’s equities, including long residence and gainful
employment in the United States.103 With respect to the context of the
underlying conviction, the Court observed that although Vartelas
“helped his [business] partner perforate the sheets into individual
checks,” he personally “did not sell the checks or receive any money
96

Id. at 1484 (quoting Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1963)).
See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2012).
98 Id. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (providing that LPRs must seek re-admission if they
have “committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title”); see, e.g., id.
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (crimes involving moral turpitude); id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)
(controlled substance offenses); id. § 1182(a)(2)(B) (multiple criminal convictions of
any type); id. § 1182(a)(2)(D) (prostitution or commercialized vice); id.
§ 1182(a)(2)(I) (money laundering).
99 For example, LPRs are only deportable for a conviction involving moral
turpitude if committed within five years of entry to the United States. Id. § 1227(a)(2).
Additionally, one must have an actual conviction to trigger the deportation ground,
while the grounds of admissibility can be triggered even without a conviction.
100 See Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1485.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1485-86.
103 Id. at 1485; see also id. at 1487-88 (“It is no answer to say, as the Government
suggests, that Vartelas could have avoided any adverse consequences if he simply
stayed at home in the United States, his residence for 24 years prior to his 2003 visit to
his parents in Greece.”).
97
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from the venture.”104 And the reason Vartelas traveled abroad, wrote
Justice Ginsburg, was “to visit his aging parents.”105
The Court also noted that Vartelas’s first two attorneys in his
deportation proceedings had been highly ineffective.106 One failed to
appear for two hearings and did not file a requested brief, while the
other undertook a doomed strategy of conceding removability and
seeking a waiver of the inadmissibility grounds. After Vartelas’s
deportation order became final, a third attorney filed a timely motion
to reopen, alleging that the statutory provision at issue did not apply
retroactively to deprive Vartelas of lawful status on the basis of a preIIRIRA conviction.107
Regarding the merits, the Court was “[g]uided by the deeply rooted
presumption against retroactive legislation.”108 This presumption, the
Court noted, “embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our
Republic.”109 The Court agreed with Vartelas’s contention that
applying IIRIRA retroactively attaches a “new disability” to his past
conviction. In particular, application of the new provision to persons
like Vartelas would burden their ability to travel abroad “to fulfill
religious obligations, attend funerals and weddings of family members,
tend to vital financial interests, or respond to family emergencies.”110
The Court found the loss of the ability to journey outside of the
country to be a draconian sanction.111
The majority was particularly troubled that the law reached past
criminal history long “over and done” before the new provision came
into effect.112 Indeed, the Court suggested the retroactivity issue in
Vartelas was even more problematic than the provision considered in
St. Cyr. St. Cyr’s guilty plea had left him with only the possibility of
104

Id. at 1485.
Id.
106 See id. at 1485-86.
107 Id. at 1486. The BIA denied the motion to reopen on the grounds that prior
counsel’s ineffective assistance had not prejudiced Vartelas because no law prevented
retroactive application of IIRIRA’s admission provision. The Second Circuit affirmed.
108 Id. at 1484.
109 Id. at 1486 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)).
110 Id. at 1487.
111 See id. at 1488.
112 Id. at 1487; see also id. at 1489 (“Vartelas, we have several times stressed,
engaged in no criminal activity after IIRIRA’s passage. . . . Vartelas was apprehended
because of a pre-IIRIRA crime he was ‘helpless to undo.’”); id. at 1490 (“That new
disability rested not on any continuing criminal activity, but on a single crime
committed years before IIRIRA’s enactment.”).
105
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seeking discretionary relief from removal. Vartelas’s plea, in contrast,
did not expose him to deportation and left him free to make brief,
unencumbered trips abroad until IIRIRA went into effect.113
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices
Thomas and Alito, confirmed the equity-driven nature of the
majority’s ruling. Indeed, Justice Scalia scolded the majority for
contorting the statutory text in order to reach a “fair” result in the
case.114 The dissenters reasoned that the relevant activity was not
Vartelas’s plea, but rather his later departure and reentry to the United
States, which in this case occurred years after the effective date of
IIRIRA.115
Vartelas, like St. Cyr, exhibited the Court’s concern with the
retroactive attachment of harsh immigration consequences to past
criminal history. Although the Court did not invalidate the statute at
issue in Vartelas, it again applied an anti-retroactivity norm to the
operation of the provision in a way that exempted from its reach LPRs
with old convictions.116 As discussed further below, the case also
illustrates the importance of post-order motions to reopen as vehicles
for injecting some equity into the removal system,117 as well as the
Court’s related concerns about avoidable deportations due to shoddy
lawyering, which lurks as an important background factor in a
number of the Court’s decisions.118

113 Although the Court made clear that a noncitizen need not demonstrate actual
reliance on the pre-IIRIRA legal regime to benefit from the anti-retroactivity principle,
Justice Ginsburg speculated that “Vartelas likely relied on then-existing immigration
law” when he pleaded guilty in 1994. Id. at 1491-92. The Court also observed that
Congress did not expressly indicate that the statutory provision would have
retroactive effect, while other provisions of IIRIRA did indicate retroactive application.
Id. at 1487.
114 Id. at 1495-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115 See id. at 1492-93, 1496. Seen from that viewpoint, the 1996 amendment simply
was not retroactive. See id. at 1493-94.
116 Vartelas did not challenge the agency’s determination that Congress abrogated
the Court’s Fleuti doctrine, which had protected LPRs who briefly sojourn abroad
from application of the INA’s inadmissibility provisions. See generally THOMAS
ALEXANDER ALEINEKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS & POLICY (7th
ed. 2012) (discussing the admission procedures). The Vartelas Court noted in a
footnote that it was assuming, but not deciding, that the agency’s determination that
Fleuti was prospectively abrogated was correct. Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1484, n.2.
117 See infra Part II.D.
118 See infra text accompanying notes 119–39, 262–71 (discussing Padilla and
Mata). On the quality of representation in immigration proceedings generally, see
Elizabeth Keyes, Zealous Advocacy: Pushing Against the Borders in Immigration
Litigation, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 475 (2015).
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The Court’s discomfort with the inflexible operation and harsh
consequences of current deportation rules was even more apparent in
its 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,119 which took the rare step of
regulating an aspect of the removal system through a constitutional
criminal procedure ruling.120 The Court’s watershed holding in that
case — that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense counsel
to render effective advice about the potential immigration
consequences of a conviction — marked a significant departure from
the views of lower federal courts.121 For a majority of the Court, this
result was firmly rooted in the new realities of federal immigration
law, including the evisceration of opportunities for leniency in the face
of criminal convictions.
As in many other recent deportation cases, Justice Stevens’s opinion
for a majority of the Court emphasized the petitioner’s equities,
describing Jose Padilla as a “lawful permanent resident of the United
States for more than 40 years” who “served this Nation with honor as
a member of the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War.”122
Padilla got into trouble when a large quantity of marijuana was
discovered in his tractor-trailer. Thereafter, relying on erroneous
advice from his counsel, he pleaded guilty to drug charges that in fact
made deportation virtually automatic.
Observing that “[t]he landscape of federal immigration law has
changed dramatically over the last 90 years,”123 the Court catalogued
congressional initiatives that have come to bear on noncitizens such as
Padilla. It noted that for much of the twentieth century the grounds of
119

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
The rarity of a constitutional holding in this area is underscored by the fact that
even the Court’s substantive criminal law decisions are usually decided through
subconstitutional means. See Kate Stith-Cabranes, Criminal Law and the Supreme
Court: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Byron White, 74 COLO. L. REV. 1523, 1548
(2003); see generally Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 16
(explaining that the Court’s decisions concerning noncitizens’ rights typically employ
subconstitutional analysis, albeit informed by “phantom” constitutional norms).
121 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 383 (Alito, J. and Roberts, C.J., concurring) (calling the
majority’s decision “a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law” and noting that “the
Court’s view has been rejected by every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the
issue thus far”); see also Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1106 (2013)
(determining that Padilla constituted a new rule and should not have retroactive effect).
Justice Stevens, who had authored the majority opinion in Padilla, expressed
disappointment about the Court’s ruling in Chaidez in a post-retirement interview. See
Linda Greenhouse, Speaking Truth to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (April 16, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/opinion/speaking-truth-to-the-supreme-court.html.
122 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359.
123 Id. at 360.
120
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criminal removal were narrow. The Court emphasized the loss of
mitigating mechanisms through the repeal of INA section 212(c) and
congressional negation of the ability of sentencing judges to issue a
Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation, which Justice Stevens
described as “a critically important procedural protection to minimize
the risk of unjust deportation.”124 The Court zeroed in on the fact that
“immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable
offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh
consequences of deportation,” with the result that “the drastic
measure of deportation . . . is now virtually inevitable for a vast
number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.”125
Padilla directly speaks to a distinct consequence of modern
immigration law’s unbending reliance on criminal history — namely,
that a large number of noncitizens might plead guilty to offenses
triggering their deportation without adequate notice. It would be
constitutionally unfair, the Court reasoned, to allow persons to plead
guilty without being aware that the penalty of deportation would
follow. Rooted in the Sixth Amendment’s command that criminal
defendants be afforded adequate assistance of counsel, the decision as
a technical matter puts constitutional obligations only on criminal
defense attorneys. As a practical matter, however, the ruling will
pressure prosecutors and judges to ensure that defense attorneys have
adequately advised their clients so that convictions cannot be later be
undone on ineffective assistance grounds.126
The constitutional holding in Padilla performs equitable work in
two ways. First, the Court’s regulation of the fairness of noncitizens’
plea bargains in criminal court counteracts, to some degree, the special
risks of unfairness posed in deportation proceedings, which the Court
cannot so easily regulate.127 Because deportation has long been held
not to constitute criminal punishment, there is no constitutional right
to the assistance of counsel in immigration court.128 The Fifth
124 Id. at 361 (emphasis added); see also Cade, Return of the JRAD, supra note 31, at
38-41 (discussing Congress’s abrogation of the JRAD).
125 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
126 Cf. Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own Path, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 501 (2011) (“As a practical matter, state and federal
prosecutors, and by extension defense lawyers, play an important role in determining
which noncitizens will be deported permanently or with the possibility of
administrative relief.”).
127 See Christopher N. Lasch, “Crimmigration” and the Right to Counsel at the Border
Between Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2131, 2150 (2014).
128 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that
deportation is not punishment).
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Amendment requires that deportation procedures satisfy due
process,129 but, because of a longstanding pattern of extreme judicial
deference in this area, Congress has enjoyed a virtual blank check
when it comes to formulating the substantive rules of removal.130 The
Sixth Amendment right espoused in Padilla thus gives noncitizens a
form of stand-in protection, operating to guard against the most
inequitable crime-based deportations — namely, those deportations
that result from guilty pleas in which the noncitizen’s defense attorney
failed to give sound advice regarding a critical life choice.131
The Court also pursued a second equitable goal in Padilla, by
encouraging actors in the criminal proceedings to evaluate the
potential immigration consequences in their framing of charges, pleas,
and sentences.132 As the Court explained:
By bringing deportation consequences into the process, the
defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements
that better satisfy the interests of both parties. As in this case, a
criminal episode may provide the basis for multiple charges, of
which only a subset mandate deportation following
conviction. . . . Counsel . . . may be able to plea bargain
creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and
sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding
a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal
consequence.133

129 See Landon v. Plascencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S.
86, 99-100 (1903).
130 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713; The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
131 See Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Strickland-Lite: Padilla’s Two-Tiered
Duty for Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 844, 848 (2013); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole
Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration
Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 307 (2012); Lasch, supra note 127, at
2149; Traum, supra note 126, at 529-30.
132 See Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393,
1395 (2011) (“The majority opinion predicts and intends that the Padilla rule will
change the substantive outcomes of plea bargaining between prosecutors and the
defense . . . .”); Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions:
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1743
(2011) (“The purpose of enforcing a duty to advise is not merely to ensure that the
defendant is aware of the consequences of his or her conviction, but to provide the
defendant with the opportunity to seek a more desirable result through a plea
bargain.”).
133 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (emphasis added).
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The relevant equitable frame for decisionmaking — including by
government lawyers — thus includes not just the criminal sanction
but also the immigration penalty.134 The Court again underscored the
“severity of deportation — ‘the equivalent of banishment or exile,’”135
directly acknowledging the need for a negotiation structure to avert or
minimize the possibility of removal in appropriate cases. Indeed, this
appears to be one of the reasons the Court interpreted the Sixth
Amendment not only to prohibit misadvice, such as that received by
Padilla, but also to impose an affirmative obligation on counsel to
provide accurate information about immigration consequences.136
Thus, Padilla’s Sixth Amendment rule infuses defense attorneys’
predictive obligation with a normative character. Attorneys
representing noncitizens must be knowledgeable about immigration
law and their client’s circumstances in order to accurately forecast the
immigration consequences likely to follow the relevant convictions.
But, in addition, Justice Stevens’s opinion anticipates and even expects
that defense attorneys will help their clients avoid unjust immigration
consequences through “creative plea bargaining.”137 Although Padilla
alone does not elevate that equitable expectation to a mandate, the
Court’s recent decision in Lafler v. Cooper suggests that defendants are
constitutionally entitled to the going-rate for plea opportunities in
their jurisdiction.138 Thus, it may well be that in localities where
134 See Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky:
The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1461, 1504 (2011) (“[T]he criminal process is simply the envelope within which the
potential deportation sanction happens to be packaged.”).
135 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373 (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-91
(1947)).
136 See id. at 374.
137 See Cade, Plea Bargain Crisis, supra note 31, at 1772-75; Bill Ong Hing, The
Pressure Is On — Criminal Defense Counsel Strategies After Padilla v. Kentucky, 92
DENV. L. REV. 835, 835 (2015) (arguing that defense counsel should engage strategies
to avoid or minimize the immigration consequences of convictions for lawfully
present noncitizens); Rebecca Sharpless, Clear and Simple Deportation Rules for Crimes:
Why We Need Them and Why It’s Hard to Get Them, 92 DENV. L. REV. 933, 934 (2015)
(arguing that “the Padilla duty requires defense attorneys to . . . attempt to negotiate
immigration-safe pleas”).
138 See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012) (holding that “loss of the
plea opportunity” that defendant “would have received in the ordinary course” fell
below constitutional standards of representation); see also Bowers, Baselines, supra
note 17, at 1105 (arguing that as a consequence of Lafler and Missouri v. Frye, courts
must consider “party-driven ‘practice law’” to evaluate whether defendant received
what he would have “in the ordinary course” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment
analysis); Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2560, 2660-65
(2013) (arguing that the Court’s recent plea bargaining cases provide support “for a

2017]

Judging Immigration Equity

1059

immigration-specific plea-bargaining is or becomes standard practice,
defense attorneys who fail to competently engage in such bargaining
will fall below constitutional minimums.139
Undoubtedly, in particular jurisdictions or with particular
prosecutors, it might not be fruitful for a defense lawyer to focus
attention on the client’s immigration status. Many prosecutors
disagree that immigration consequences are relevant to the criminal
charge whatsoever, while others may view deportation of noncitizen
defendants as a desirable outcome.140 But many prosecutors — in part
because they routinely make equity-driven charging and pleabargaining choices — may well consider assessment of severe direct or
collateral consequences to be part of their duty to see that justice is
done.141 As the norms of Padilla become internalized in the criminal
justice system over time, bargaining over deportation consequences
may well become commonplace.142 The overarching message of Padilla
constitutional right to effective bargaining,” judged by “counsel’s success or failure in
following prevailing professional norms”).
139 See Bowers, Baselines, supra note 17, at 1105-06 (suggesting that the Court’s
recent plea bargain cases may entitle criminal defendants to “‘creative’ bargaining that
is designed to circumvent legally permissible trial charges and sentences”); Josh
Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, 1153-54, 1159-60
(2013); Roberts, supra note 138, at 2668.
140 See, e.g., Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of
Justice for Non-Citizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 28-32 (2012) (presenting data on
range of attitudes in Brooklyn district attorney’s office regarding appropriateness of
taking immigration consequences into account during plea bargaining); Brown, supra
note 132, at 1400-02 (arguing that prosecutors are unlikely to be sympathetic or to
enjoy much charging leeway in high-volume drug trafficking cases); Eagly, Criminal
Justice for Noncitizens, supra note 80, at 1156-96 (discussing three prosecutors’ offices
where alienage is variously treated as a neutral or negative factor); Eisha Jain,
Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197 (2016) (discussing the
structural incentives that lead prosecutors to influence collateral consequences).
141 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 26; LIPSKY, supra note 41, at 22 (discussing
prosecutors’ use of alternative charges to avert harsh mandatory drug sentences where
unjustified by the defendants actual circumstances); Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note
25, at 1686-87 (discussing the greater deference prosecutors receive in determining
what to charge); Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum, supra note 25, at 1435 (discussing
efforts by The Sentencing Commission to restrain prosecutorial discretion).
142 See, e.g., Altman, supra note 140, at 34-35 (arguing that professional
responsibility standards and proportionality concerns do or will lead many
prosecutors to individually evaluate justifiability of deportation); Eagly, Criminal
Justice for Noncitizens, supra note 80, at 1156-96 (discussing prosecutors’ offices with
charging policies that benefit noncitizens); Robert M. A. Johnson, A Prosecutor’s
Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 129, 130 (2011)
(arguing that Padilla will directly and indirectly influence prosecutors’ consideration
of collateral consequences, presenting an opportunity to both do “justice and improve
public safety”).
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— a message both accurate and practically significant — is that
immigration enforcement is now highly dependent on the outcome of
criminal law and process. In such a world, it makes little sense for
prosecutorial officials (or the judges with whom those officials
routinely interact) to turn a blind eye to the immigration
consequences of prosecutorial decisions. Until Congress rolls back the
breadth and reach of criminal deportation rules, the burden of helping
the system achieve proportionality will fall heavily on criminal-justicesystem actors, a reality that the Court plainly envisioned in Padilla.143
2.

Preserving Deals and Discretion

If one goal of Padilla was to create opportunities for noncitizen
defendants to reach plea deals that avoid deportation or that preserve
possibilities for equitable discretionary relief in later deportation
proceedings, still other cases decided over the last decade have worked
toward the same objective by narrowing the range of criminal
convictions that trigger mandatory removal. These decisions primarily
have involved challenges to the immigration consequences of drug
convictions that, while given lenient treatment under state law, were
charged as aggravated felony deportation grounds by ICE prosecutors
in efforts to foreclose the possibility of equitable relief.144 The Roberts
Court has repeatedly rejected these efforts by stringently requiring a
categorical match between the elements of the criminal offense and the
removal ground.145 Through these cases, the Court has reigned in the
harshest interpretations of the criminal removal provisions and

143 See Hing, supra note 137, at 835 (arguing that the constitutional duty of Padilla
places “tremendous pressure on defense counsel”); Sharpless, supra note 137, at 934
(discussing the duties of defense attorneys in light of the decision in Padilla); cf. Stacy
Caplow, Governors! Seize the Law: A Call to Expand the Use of Pardons to Provide Relief
from Deportation, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 293 (2013) (arguing that governors should
pardon noncitizens in appropriate cases in order to remove the prospect of
deportation).
144 Aggravated felonies make noncitizens subject to mandatory detention, ineligible
for discretionary relief from deportation, and permanently prohibited from lawful
return to the U.S. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (2012) (aggravated felony bar to lawful admission to the
United States); id. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (aggravated felony bar to asylum and
withholding of removal); id. § 1229b(a)(3) (aggravated felony bar to cancellation of
removal for LPRs); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (aggravated felony bar to cancellation of
removal for non-LPRs).
145 Two notable exceptions from the general thrust of this strict categorical
approach, Nijhawan v. Holder and Torres v. Lynch, are discussed below. See infra text
accompanying notes 207–14.
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safeguarded at least limited opportunities for equitable
decisionmaking in deportation proceedings.
In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,146 for example, decided during the
same term as Padilla, the government pressed the argument that
Carachuri-Rosendo’s two minor state-law drug possession crimes
would have made him a felony recidivist drug offender under the
Controlled Substances Act, had he been federally prosecuted.147 A
federal recidivist drug conviction would be deemed an aggravated
felony, thereby disqualifying Carachuri-Rosendo from cancellation of
removal or other discretionary relief. Carachuri-Rosendo conceded his
deportability for a controlled substance violation, but argued that the
aggravated felony ground of removal was inappropriate since he had
not actually been charged as a recidivist.148
As in Padilla, Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court began by
cataloguing Carachuri-Rosendo’s longstanding ties to the United
States, along with other facts that nudged the scales in favor of
leniency.149 The Court then framed Carachuri-Rosendo’s criminal
history in a sympathetic light: “Like so many in this country,
Carachuri-Rosendo has gotten into some trouble with our drug
laws.”150 The Court noted, however, that petty simple possession does
not comport with the “‘everyday understanding’” of what it means to
engage in drug trafficking.151 Indeed, the Court found the
government’s characterization of “unauthorized possession of a trivial
amount of a prescription drug” as an aggravated felony to be, “to say
the least, counterintuitive and ‘unorthodox,’” especially when the
defendant had received only a 10-day sentence.152 Endorsing a
“‘common sense conception’” of the statute, the Court declared it was
“very wary” — in fact, “doubly wary” — of the government’s
position.153

146

560 U.S. 563 (2010).
See id. at 575-78.
148 See id. at 571.
149 See id. at 570-71.
150 Id. at 570.
151 Id. at 574.
152 Id. (citing Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47 (2006)); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 35, Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. 563 (No. 09-60) (Justice Ginsburg
commenting that the INA should not be read to require the “absurd result” that
noncitizens convicted of minor drug possession crimes be deported and “never, ever
darken our doors again”).
153 Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 573-75 (citing to Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47
(2006) and Black’s Law Dictionary).
147
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The Court then emphasized the appropriateness of a “categorical
inquiry” in determining immigration consequences of criminal
offenses, noting that the deportation statute requires that the
noncitizen be “convicted of an aggravated felony.”154 In CarachuriRosendo’s case, the court record for his second offense — the
government-posited recidivist (and thus aggravated) felony conviction
— contained “no finding of the fact of his prior drug offense.”155
Furthermore, the Court noted, had Carachuri-Rosendo in fact been
prosecuted in federal court as a felony recidivist, he would have been
entitled to “mandatory notice and process requirements,” as well as an
opportunity to contest the validity of the predicate conviction.156 The
government argued these procedural protections were “meaningless,”
or in any event could be satisfied with comparable procedures in
immigration court (for example, with an opportunity to contest the
earlier conviction). As it had done in Padilla, however, the Court took
a realistic view of the limited procedural protections afforded in
deportation proceedings, rejecting these arguments.157
Carachuri-Rosendo revealed the Court again focusing on the need to
preserve prosecutorial discretion in the conviction-to-removal
pipeline. The federal procedural prerequisites, Justice Stevens
emphasized, allow prosecutors to choose, in the exercise of discretion,
whether to seek a recidivist enhancement.158 Many state codes afford
state prosecutors similar discretion.159 Allowing immigration judges to
apply their own recidivist enhancements, Justice Stevens found,
“would denigrate the independent judgment of state prosecutors.”160
Indeed, as the Court observed, in Carachuri-Rosendo’s own criminal
case, “the prosecutor specifically elected to ‘[a]bandon’ a recidivist
enhancement under state law.”161 One can only speculate on the
prosecutor’s motives for doing so, but the Court’s ruling ensured that
such actions by government attorneys will impact the ensuing
immigration proceedings. The Court’s analysis means that criminal

154

Id. at 576 (emphasis in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted); id. at 580.
Id. at 576.
156 Id. at 578.
157 See id. at 578-80.
158 See id. at 579.
159 See id.
160 Id. at 579-80; see also Traum, supra note 126, at 529 (“The prosecutor’s decision
to pursue a recidivist enhancement, the Court explained, is equivalent to a charging
decision, i.e., it is not automatic but a calculated choice by the prosecutor, which must
be afforded deference.”).
161 Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 579-80.
155
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court outcomes of this sort will have predictable immigration
consequences, including the preservation of narrow opportunities for
discretionary relief.
The Court took much the same approach in Moncrieffe v. Holder.162
Adrian Moncrieffe, a lawful permanent resident with two U.S. citizen
children, “came to the United States legally in 1984, when he was
three.”163 In 2007, Moncrieffe was stopped while driving in Georgia
and arrested for possessing 1.3 grams of marijuana (about two or three
cigarettes’ worth).164 He later pleaded guilty as first-time offender to
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.165 ICE asserted that
Moncrieffe’s conviction166 triggered the “illicit trafficking” aggravated
felony ground of removal.167 The immigration judge agreed, and
Moncrieffe’s order of deportation was upheld by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and the Fifth Circuit.168
The Court rejected the government’s position, with seven Justices in
the majority, thus opening the door for a discretionary judgment by an
immigration judge about the justifiability of Moncrieffe’s deportation.
The Court found that Moncrieffe’s state conviction did not adequately
map onto a federal offense constituting an aggravated felony. Justice
Sotomayor’s opinion for the majority emphasized, with even more
clarity than the Court had provided in prior cases, the categorical
analysis that should be employed to determine the immigration
consequences of criminal convictions. To trigger deportation under
this approach, a state offense must be a “categorical match” with the
relevant federal offense, and a “state offense is a categorical match
with a generic federal offense only if a conviction of the state offense
162

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
Id. at 1683; see also Brief for Petitioner at 4, Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (No. 11702) (discussing Moncrieffe’s life in the United States).
164 Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683. For an argument that Moncrieffe was racially
profiled, see Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the
Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 MICH. J.L. REFORM
967, 993-96 (2015).
165 Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30(j)(1) (2007)
(providing the statute under which Moncrieffe was charged).
166 Moncrieffe’s status as a first-time offender meant that the court withheld
entering a conviction or imposing jail time, with the result that if Moncrieffe
successfully completed a five-year probationary period his charge would be expunged
altogether. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-60(a) (1997). However, the INA requires such
dispositions continue to be treated as convictions for purposes of deportation
consequences. See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 675-76.
167 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012).
168 See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387, 389-90 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d and
remanded, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
163
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necessarily involved . . . facts equating to the generic federal
offense.”169 The noncitizen’s actual conduct, the Court explained, “is
quite irrelevant” to the categorical approach.170 Instead, courts “must
presume that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least
of the acts criminalized, and then determine whether even those acts
are encompassed by the generic federal offense.”171 Put simply, if the
state statute criminalizes conduct that is broader than the generic
federal offense referenced in the INA, there is a categorically
insufficient match between the offenses to warrant imposition of the
relevant removal ground.
Under federal law, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
constitutes a felony, punishable by five years imprisonment, except
that possession with intent to distribute only a small amount of
marijuana for no remuneration is punishable only as a
misdemeanor.172 In Moncrieffe, the government had argued that this
exception did not serve to define the elements of the federal offense,
but rather operated only as a mitigating sentencing factor.173 Indeed,
as a practical matter it seems that defendants prosecuted under the
marijuana distribution statute in federal criminal court bear the
burden to prove to the sentencing judge that the misdemeanor
sentencing exception should apply.174 The government argued that a
similar approach could be followed in immigration proceedings, with
state distribution convictions treated by default as aggravated felonies
unless the noncitizen can prove the mitigating factors to the
immigration judge.175
The Court found the government’s approach would cast the
deportation net too wide, subjecting noncitizens whose conduct was
not egregious to a mandatory removal category.176 Some state-law
marijuana distribution convictions would unambiguously correspond
only with federal misdemeanors, involving just a small amount of
marijuana and no remuneration. The Court found untenable the
169 Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1680 (internal quotation marks and alteration marks
omitted).
170 Id. at 1684 (internal quotation marks omitted).
171 Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration marks omitted).
172 See id. at 1685-86 (discussing 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b) and 812(c)).
173 See id. at 1687; see also id. at 1698 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“As the Court notes,
every Court of Appeals to consider the question has held that § 841(a) is the default
offense and that § 841(b)(4) is only a mitigating sentencing guideline.”).
174 See id. at 1687-88 (majority opinion).
175 See id. at 1690.
176 See id. at 1689 (discussing a New York statute criminalizing only the
distribution of a small amount of marijuana for remuneration).
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government’s proposed “minitrial” approach to mitigation. In doing
so, the majority relied in part on the statutory language, but it also
evinced a functional, real-world understanding of the deficiencies of
immigration court procedures. The Court emphasized the unfairness
of asking noncitizens to “locate witnesses years after the fact,
notwithstanding that during removal proceedings noncitizens are not
guaranteed legal representation and are often subject to mandatory
detention.”177 The Court’s insistence on a strict categorical approach
in Moncrieffe thus not only promoted efficiency and predictability, but
also took account of fairness concerns that confront individuals
targeted for deportation.178
Notably, the Court concluded its opinion in Moncrieffe by chiding
the Government for its overzealous approach to the criminal
deportation provisions:
This is the third time in seven years that we have considered
whether the Government has properly characterized a lowlevel drug offense as “illicit trafficking in a controlled
substance,” and thus an “aggravated felony.” Once again we
hold that the Government’s approach defies “the
commonsense conception” of these terms. 179
Justice Sotomayor’s message was clear: the Court believes the
executive’s approach to the removal of LPRs with minor criminal
history has been unduly aggressive.180
In Mellouli v. Lynch,181 decided in 2015, the Court once again
rejected the government’s scorched-earth approach to seeking the
deportation of LPRs with minor drug crimes. Following an arrest for
177 See id. at 1690. Noncitizens presumably would need to present witnesses to
testify that no cash changed hands when the drug was distributed, as lack of
remuneration would make the offense punishable as a federal misdemeanor.
178 Cf. Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical
Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 1032 (2008) (“While
it is reasonable to expect noncitizens to be on notice regarding the immigration
consequences of the facts necessary to the offense, it is unreasonable to expect
noncitizens to be on notice that facts outside the elements of the crime will later be
used against them.”); see also Das, supra note 132, at 1727-42 (detailing the benefits of
deviating from a categorical analysis approach).
179 Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1693 (quoting Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S.
563, 573 (2010)).
180 See Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 101 (arguing
that Moncrieffe and Carachuri-Rosendo “demonstrate the Court’s reluctance to subject
long-term lawful permanent residents of the United States to . . . mandatory removal
based on relatively small-time drug convictions”).
181 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015).
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driving offenses, Moones Mellouli was held in detention and officers
discovered four Adderall pills in his sock.182 As a result, the state
charged Mellouli with trafficking contraband in jail.183 A deal was later
struck, and the amended complaint to which Mellouli pleaded guilty
charged only the lesser offense of possessing drug paraphernalia — to
wit, a sock — and did not identify the substance that the officers had
seized.184 Nevertheless, ICE pursued Mellouli’s removal, predicated on
the controlled substance ground, and in fact deported him.185
Although Mellouli had been lawfully present in the United States since
2004 and had established significant ties in his community,186 he was
ineligible to seek discretionary cancellation of removal because he had
not accrued sufficient continuous presence in lawful status at the time
of his arrest and conviction.187
In a 7–2 decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that
Mellouli’s drug paraphernalia conviction was not a removable offense.
First, the Court noted that federal law does not criminalize simple
possession of drug paraphernalia.188 In addition, federal law defines
drug paraphernalia, for purposes of non-possessory crimes such as
production or trafficking, as “any ‘equipment, product, or material’
which is ‘primarily intended or designed for use’ in connection with
various drug-related activities,” in contrast to “common household or
ready-to-wear items like socks.”189 Justice Ginsburg also observed that
in 19 states Mellouli’s conduct would not even have been deemed a
criminal offense.190

182

See id. at 1985.
Id.
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See id. at 1984-85 (noting that Mellouli entered the U.S. on a student visa in
2004, earned undergraduate and graduate degrees with distinction, taught
mathematics at University of Missouri-Columbia, became an LPR in 2011, and is
engaged to a U.S. citizen).
187 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a), (d) (2012)
(requiring, inter alia, that noncitizens seeking cancellation of removal have five years
in LPR status and seven years continuous residence after lawful admission, and
specifying that initiation of removal proceedings or commission of a removable
criminal offense will stop the accrual of time for purposes of establishing presence or
residence).
188 Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985.
189 Id.
190 See id. (“At most, it is a low-level infraction, often not attended by a right to
counsel.”).
183

2017]

Judging Immigration Equity

1067

Once again underscoring the necessity of a categorical approach to
analyzing the immigration consequences of criminal convictions,191
the Court noted that the INA’s controlled-substance ground of
removal applies only to noncitizens “convicted of a violation of . . .
any law or regulation . . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined
in section 802 of Title 21).”192 Immigration officials’ theory for
Mellouli’s deportability was that “a paraphernalia conviction ‘relates
to’ any and all controlled substances, whether or not federally listed,
with which the paraphernalia can be used.”193 The Court, however,
concluded that this theory of deportability “finds no home” in the
statutory text and “leads to consequences Congress could not have
intended.”194 In particular, the Court was troubled by the “anomalous
result” that minor paraphernalia offenses could trigger removal more
easily than offenses based on the actual possession or distribution of
drugs, since those offenses support removal only if they involve a
federally controlled substance.195
The Court also rejected an alternative rationale urged by the
government to support Mellouli’s removability, which Justice
Thomas’s dissenting opinion (joined by Justice Alito) largely
endorsed.196 The government argued that because there is
“substantial[] overlap” between Kansas’s drug schedule and the federal
schedules, the state statute could reasonably be construed to be
“related to” federally controlled drugs.197 The Court, however, found
this construction of the statute unacceptable, because it would trigger
deportation based on state convictions even where no federally
controlled offense was involved.198 Justice Ginsburg hammered on the
191

See id. at 1985-87.
Id. at 1981-82; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
193 Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1982 (quoting and citing Martinez Espinoza, 25 I.&N.
Dec. 118 (2009)). As the Eighth Circuit put it, Mellouli’s conviction “‘relates to’ a
federally controlled substance because it is a crime . . . ‘associated with the drug trade
in general.’” Id. at 1988-89.
194 See id. at 1989 (citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2013)).
195 See id. (“The incongruous upshot is that an alien is not removable for
possessing a substance controlled only under Kansas law, but he is removable for
using a sock to contain that substance.”).
196 Id.; see also id. at 1991-93 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For Justice Thomas, the
“relating to” language in the removal statute should be interpreted broadly, and
“faithfully applying that text means that an alien may be deported for committing an
offense that does not involve a federally controlled substance.” Id. at 1991-95.
197 Id. at 1989 (majority opinion).
198 See id. at 1990 (observing that “the Government’s construction of the federal
removal statute stretches to the breaking point, reaching state-court convictions, like
Mellouli’s, in which ‘[no] controlled substance (as defined in [§ 802])’ figures as an
192
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need for categorical analysis, explaining that drug-crime-based
removals require “a direct link between an alien’s crime of conviction
and a particular federally controlled drug.”199 The government’s
approach would break that link, sweeping in offenses with only “some
general relation” to federally controlled substances.200
Notably, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the majority recognized,
with apparent approval, Professor Jennifer Koh’s observation that the
categorical approach enables noncitizens “to enter ‘safe harbor’ guilty
pleas” that avoid immigration sanctions.201 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg
conjectured, Mellouli’s own plea may have involved just such an
effort, in light of the deal struck and the amended complaint’s
omission of the nature of the discovered pills in Mellouli’s sock.202 As
it had done in Padilla, then, the Court in Mellouli again endorsed the
appropriateness of plea-bargain deals that help noncitizens avoid
removal when significant equities support their continued residence in
the United States.203 Moreover, in Mellouli the Court went a step
further than it had in the earlier criminal removal cases, employing
categorical analysis to reach a result that would completely avert the
possibility that Mr. Mellouli would be deported on the basis of the
conviction at issue, rather than merely preserve the possibility of backend equitable relief.
***
Mellouli and the Court’s other recent crime-based-deportation
rulings work hand-in-glove with Padilla to inject considerations of
individual fairness into the deportation process. Padilla pushes defense
attorneys to seek safe harbors for their noncitizen clients, and
prosecutors to weigh immigration-law consequences in exercising
their discretion to strike individualized plea deals. At the same time,
decisions like Mellouli help insulate criminal court deals against the
federal government’s indiscriminate approach with respect to
noncitizens with criminal history. In similar fashion, decisions such as
element of the offense”).
199 See id.
200 Id.
201 See id. at 1987 (quoting and citing Koh, supra note 131, at 295-310).
202 Id. at 1987 n.5.
203 See Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1492 n.10 (“Armed with knowledge
that a guilty plea would preclude travel abroad, aliens like Vartelas might endeavor to
negotiate a plea to a nonexcludable offense — in Vartelas’s case, e.g., possession of
counterfeit securities . . . .”).
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Carachuri-Rosendo and Moncrieffe broaden opportunities for plea
agreements that at least enable the defendant to seek discretionary
relief from removal, notwithstanding Congress’s efforts to rein in the
availability of such relief. Finally, strict and consistent application of
the Court’s categorical approach also makes it possible for defense
counsel to provide clear and accurate advice about immigration
consequences in criminal proceedings.204
It must be acknowledged that the Court has recently made a
concerted effort to implement the categorical approach more strictly in
the sentencing context as well.205 But that fact does not diminish the
significance of the case law discussed in this Part for the deportation
system, and it certainly was not inevitable that the Court would align
its analysis of determining the consequences of prior convictions in
both systems.206
Before turning to the next group of immigration decisions, I should
clarify that although the Court has generally required categorical
analysis as a means of injecting equity into the removal system, it has
departed from the strict categorical approach in a few cases. Thus, in
Nijhawan v. Holder, the Court determined that the monetary-loss
portion of aggravated felony provision concerning “fraud or deceit in
which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000” required
inquiry into the specific circumstances surrounding an offender’s
commission of the crime, regardless of whether the amount of loss was
a necessary element of the underlying conviction.207 As the Court later
204 See Das, supra note 132, at 1745 (arguing that the watering down of the
categorical approach “creates tensions within the criminal justice system, disrupting
defense counsel’s ability to advise immigrant clients meaningfully and complicating
the ability of all the actors in the system who want to seek more appropriate outcomes
through plea-bargaining”); Koh, supra note 131, at 298 (“The fairness concerns
associated with the categorical approach take on particular urgency in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which affirmed the ethical duty of
criminal defense counsel to accurately advise noncitizen defendants of the
immigration consequences following a guilty plea.”).
205 See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (reaffirming and
clarifying the use of the categorical approach to determine the sentencing
consequences of a prior conviction); Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276
(2013) (same); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (same).
206 See, e.g., Silva-Trevino, 24 I.&N. Dec. 687, 704 (A.G. 2008) (opinion by
Attorney General Mukasey directing immigration judges to consider “any additional
evidence” where the categorical approach fails to show that a particular conviction
constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude), vacated, Silva-Trevino, 26 I.&N. Dec.
550 (A.G. 2015); Das, supra note 132 (pointing out the immigration agency’s
divergence from the categorical approach in immigration law and the courts’ failure to
adequately correct that path).
207 See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009).
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noted in Mellouli, however, the particular statutory ground at issue in
Nijhawan was “atypical.”208 If strict categorical analysis had been
employed, the relevant deportation provisions would have had
extremely limited and inconsistent application, thwarting Congress’s
intent.
More recently, in Torres v. Lynch, a five-Justice majority of the Court
held that, despite its recent emphasis on a strict categorical approach,
state offenses need not contain an interstate commerce element in
order to trigger the various aggravated felony removal grounds that are
defined in the immigration code by way of cross-reference to federal
offenses in which such jurisdictional element is required.209 Torres
was convicted of a state arson offense that did not require any
connection to interstate commerce, but which otherwise satisfied the
elements of a federal arson and explosives statute that the INA
incorporates as an aggravated felony ground.210
Although the Court upheld the government’s position, and softened
the categorical approach with respect to the jurisdictional element, the
decision does not break from the general thrust of the Court’s recent
deportation jurisprudence and its focus on proportionality. Indeed,
Justice Kagan’s opinion for the majority took pains to explain why a
rule that does not require state crimes to contain the interstate
commerce element contained in the corresponding federal offenses
that define many of the aggravated felony categories will result in the
best overall match between serious noncitizen offenders and
banishment.211 Were Torres’s arguments to prevail, the Court found,
noncitizens who commit various egregious crimes (e.g., child
pornography offenses) would not be automatically removable as
aggravated felons, while others who engage in much more minor
crimes (e.g., operating an unlawful gambling business) still would.
And those anomalous results would follow merely from whether a
state chooses to create an interstate commerce element for the crime.
Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Thomas
and Breyer, would have interpreted the INA in a way that casts the
208

See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 n.3.
See Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1634 (2016).
210 See id. at 1623-24.
211 See id. at 1627-30. To the extent that some applications of the aggravated felony
categories triggered by state offenses lacking an interstate commerce element would
sweep too broadly in individual cases, Chief Justice Roberts suggested at oral
argument that a permissible solution would be for the attorney general to exercise
discretion and “not . . . subject the alien to removal in the first place . . . .” Transcript
of Oral Argument at 44-45, Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2015) (No. 14-1096),
2015 WL 9919328.
209
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reach of some of the aggravated felony grounds more narrowly, by
strictly requiring nonfederal statutes to contain an interstate
commerce element if the federal statute referred to in the applicable
deportation ground also contains such an element.212 Justice
Sotomayor emphasized the fact that convictions deemed aggravated
felonies deprive immigration judges of the authority to set aside
removal where, on balance, an individual’s positive equities and ties
outweigh the sanction of deportation.213 Torres, himself, she noted,
appeared to otherwise be eligible for cancellation of removal. The
dissenting opinion recognized that strict application of the categorical
approach would allow some serious offenders to evade particular
removal grounds. Justice Sotomayor pointed out, however, that such
risk is mitigated because many such convictions would also fall into
the generic “crime of violence” aggravated felony removal category,
which does not contain the jurisdictional interstate-commerce hook,
or within other removal categories for which discretionary relief
would be possible but not likely granted.214
At the end of the day, the Torres majority was uncomfortable with
an interpretation of the aggravated felony provision that would have
made it more difficult for the government to remove some very serious
noncitizen offenders. The dissenters, in contrast, would have drawn
the line in a different place, preserving more possibilities for
immigration judges to consider individual equities and circumstances
in determining the appropriateness of deportation. The take-away is
that both the majority and dissenting opinions in Torres reflect the
Justices’ continuing concern with proportionality in the operation of
immigration laws, including for noncitizens with criminal histories.
Importantly, though, Torres shows that the Court’s proportionality
concerns are not necessarily a one-way ratchet. While the Court’s
jurisprudence in this area largely works to increase structural
possibilities for noncitizens to avoid removal, the equities add up
differently, at least for a majority of the Justices, when it comes to the
deportation of egregious criminal offenders.
C. Arbitrary and Capricious Charging Discretion
Judulang v. Holder,215 handed down in 2011, has received less
academic scrutiny than other recent deportation decisions. Although
212
213
214
215

See Torres, 136 S. Ct. at 1634 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1634-35.
See id. at 1636-38.
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
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the case involved an unusual set of facts, some aspects of the Court’s
decision may prove to be influential.
Like St. Cyr, the Judulang case concerned INA section 212(c), the
discretionary relief provision repealed in 1996. To understand the
Court’s ruling, one must know something about the background
statutory structure. Section 212(c) was located in the inadmissibility
section of the INA, and therefore did not clearly authorize
immigration judges to set aside deportation grounds for equitable
reasons. After much litigation, primarily involving challenges on equal
protection grounds, the BIA adopted a policy of extending 212(c)
discretionary relief to noncitizens facing deportation on criminal
grounds, but only if the deportation ground with which they were
charged had a comparable inadmissibility ground in the INA.216 The
vast majority of circuits then upheld this “comparable grounds”
approach as a reasonable interpretation of the statute.217
In Judulang, a unanimous Court found this agency practice to be an
“arbitrary and capricious” restriction on eligibility for relief from
removal, thereby violating the Administrative Procedures Act.218 The
Court emphasized that agency practices with respect to a noncitizen’s
eligibility for discretionary relief must be tied to “the purposes of the
immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration
system.”219 Justice Kagan, who authored the majority decision, never
explicitly defined these “purposes” or what is meant by the
“appropriate operation” of the deportation system. Nevertheless, the
opinion evidences the Court’s clear discomfort with a deportation
system that allows agency officials to exercise prosecutorial discretion
without regard to the “alien’s fitness to remain in the country.”220
Throughout the opinion, the Court focused on the need to connect
agency policies regarding criminal noncitizens’ eligibility for
216

See id. at 480-82.
See Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 91-93
(describing Judulang as “a stinging rebuke of the BIA’s reasoning and the U.S.
government’s defense of it”).
218 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 485, 487; see also Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion:
How Judulang Limits Executive Immigration Policy-Making Authority and Opens
Channels for Future Challenges, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 48 (2012) (contending that
Judulang marked a significant doctrinal move “from a weaker, process-oriented APA
review of immigration policy to a more rigorous and independent review of the
policy’s merits”).
219 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 485; see also id. at 487 (observing that the agency’s
comparable grounds approach to 212(c) relief has “no connection to the goals of the
deportation process or the rational operation of the immigration laws”).
220 Id. at 484-85.
217
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discretionary relief to the actual merits of deportation in individual
cases. Justice Kagan opined that the agency’s comparable-grounds
approach “does not rest on any factors relevant to whether an alien . . .
should be deported”221 and “has nothing to do with whether a
deportable alien . . . merits the ability to seek a waiver.”222 In fact, the
agency’s methodology for determining whether a noncitizen may
qualify for relief “is as extraneous to the merits of the case as a coin
flip would be.”223 This, the Court found, is because the
correspondence (or not) of a charged deportation ground with a
ground of inadmissibility is arbitrary. The Court explained that the
government’s approach to deciding who may seek discretionary relief
must take into account “the alien’s prior offense or his other attributes
and circumstances.”224 The ruling thus again signaled the importance
of normative balancing and proportionality in the agency’s
implementation of the deportation statute.
The Court appeared particularly troubled by the tendency of this
agency scheme to allow discretionary charging decisions by individual
immigration prosecutors to bring about arbitrary or capricious
results.225 As Justice Kagan explained, “underneath this layer of
arbitrariness lies yet another, because the outcome of the Board’s
comparable-grounds analysis itself may rest on the happenstance of an
immigration official’s charging decision.”226 This possibility obtains
because a noncitizen’s conviction often may fall within several of the
INA’s deportation grounds. Accordingly, front-line ICE attorneys have
significant flexibility in determining which of several deportation
grounds to pursue, much like the discretion a prosecutor enjoys when
determining which criminal charges to levy against particular
defendants.
Coupled with the Board’s comparable-grounds approach to 212(c)
relief, this unencumbered discretion allowed the agency’s trial
attorneys to foreclose, simply through optional charging decisions,
any possibility of relief. In Judulang’s case, for example, his conviction
221 Id. at 487 (emphasis added); see also id. at 485 (“Rather than considering factors
that might be thought germane to the deportation decision, that policy hinges
§ 212(c) eligibility on an irrelevant statutory comparison between statutory
provisions.”).
222 Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
223 See id. at 485-86.
224 See id. at 485.
225 I briefly highlighted this aspect of Judulang in previous work. See Jason A. Cade,
Deporting the Pardoned, 46 UC DAVIS L. REV. 355, 416 (2012) [hereinafter Deporting the
Pardoned].
226 Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 486.
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for voluntary manslaughter fell within both the “crime involving
moral turpitude” deportation ground and the “crime of violence”
aggravated felony deportation ground. Because immigration officials
charged him under the latter provision, rather than just the former, he
was deemed ineligible for 212(c) discretionary relief under the
comparable grounds approach, as there is no ground of inadmissibility
that corresponds with the crime of violence aggravated felony
category. Justice Kagan highlighted the injustice of hinging a
noncitizen’s right to remain on an individual immigration prosecutor’s
charging decision: “An alien appearing before one official may suffer
deportation; an identically situated alien appearing before another may
gain the right to stay in the country.”227
Despite the complexity and idiosyncrasy of the particular scheme at
issue, the most important take-away from Judulang is the Court’s
willingness to employ arbitrary-and-capricious administrative review
to tether the “rational operation of the immigration laws” to a
charging scheme that focuses on the “merits of the case.”228 Read
broadly, Judulang suggests that charging decisions that arbitrarily
deprive a noncitizen of any possibility of equitable relief may be
subject to judicial scrutiny. It remains to be seen whether the Court,
or lower courts, will apply the reasoning of Judulang to weigh
challenges to other discretionary charging policies in deportation
proceedings that affect a noncitizen’s ability to present mitigating
equities.229 Such situations do exist. For example, ICE officials have
the discretionary authority to choose among alternative removal
charges in a way that, as the statute has been interpreted, can render
gubernatorial or Presidential pardons either effective or ineffective in
the immigration context.230 Even more commonly, discretionary
charging decisions can determine whether non-LPRs are channeled to
expedited removal proceedings where they enjoy fewer procedural
protections and defenses to removal.231
227

Id.
Id. at 485-87.
229 Cf. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489-92 (1999)
(rejecting plaintiff’s first amendment challenge to selective immigration enforcement).
230 See Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, supra note 225, at 373-78 (discussing this
phenomenon and arguing that Judulang might support a challenge to immigration
charging decisions that arbitrarily render gubernatorial pardons ineffective).
231 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 218, at 59-74 (discussing this phenomenon and
arguing that Judulang might facilitate challenges to an ICE officer’s decision to put
non-LPRs with aggravated felony convictions into administrative expedited removal
proceedings, which provide even weaker protections than regular deportation
proceedings). On expedited removal generally, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise
228
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At the least, Judulang provides further evidence of the Court’s
continuing concern about the lack of adjudicative discretion in the
deportation system, particularly when the government seeks to
constrict even further the already-much-narrowed possibilities for
individual balancing that remain in the code.232
D. The Second-Look Cases
Another series of recent Supreme Court decisions work toward
equitable ends by protecting noncitizens’ procedural rights in
immigration court. In the face of legislative and executive efforts to
restrict noncitizens’ ability to obtain judicial review and other means
of challenging removal orders,233 the Court has issued a number of
decisions interpreting the statute to preserve noncitizens’ ability to
reopen proceedings. These second-look cases thus help safeguard
opportunities for noncitizens to present claims for relief from removal
after the completion of their administrative immigration
proceedings.234
Consider 2008’s Dada v. Mukasey.235 An immigration judge granted
Samson Dada voluntary departure, a statutory benefit allowing him to
avoid the consequences of a deportation order but requiring him to
depart the country to Nigeria within thirty days.236 Near the end of
that period, Dada filed a timely motion to reopen his removal
proceedings in order to present evidence that he was married to a U.S.
citizen, thus providing a basis for adjustment of status.237 Dada,
however, found himself in a bind. The motion to reopen would take
of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2015).
232 But see Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of
Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367, 403-07 (2013)
(arguing that the Court resolved Judulang on administrative law principles in order to
avoid having to recognize constitutional rights of noncitizens).
233 See Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997); Traum, supra note
126, at 516 & n.148.
234 See Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 77
(“Noncitizens subject to removal from the United States regularly file motions to
reopen, seeking among other things, to present new evidence in support of claims for
relief from removal.”).
235 Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008).
236 Although the statute provides that persons granted voluntary departure at the
conclusion of removal proceedings may be granted up to 60 days to leave the country,
see 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) (2012), the immigration judge in Dada’s deportation case
gave him 30 days. Dada, 554 U.S. at 6.
237 See Dada, 554 U.S. at 6-7.

1076

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:1029

time to adjudicate, but if Dada failed to comply with the time limit for
voluntary departure he would become subject to significant statutory
penalties, including ineligibility to seek adjustment of status for ten
years.238 At the same time, if Dada complied with the departure order
and left the country in a timely fashion, he would become ineligible to
pursue his motion to reopen.239
Rejecting the government’s view that Dada’s statutory right to
reopen is constrained by the voluntary departure scheme,240 the Court
held that noncitizens must be permitted to unilaterally withdraw from
a voluntary departure order before the end of the authorized departure
period in order to pursue a motion to reopen.241 In reaching this
resolution, the majority emphasized the critical importance and long
pedigree of motions to reopen in immigration cases.242 The Court
described such motions as an “important safeguard,” the purpose of
which “is to ensure a proper and lawful disposition.”243 Driving the
Court’s statutory interpretation in Dada was its underlying concern
that without a solution preserving the ability to reopen proceedings,
noncitizens might be precluded from establishing their eligibility for
adjustment of status or other statutory rights to remain in the United
States lawfully.244
Also important to the Court’s rationale were the practical limitations
that noncitizens in Dada’s situation face. As the Court explained, the
time periods permitted for voluntary departure will frequently expire
before the agency renders a decision on the noncitizen’s motion to
238

See id. at 5.
See id.; see also 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(d) (2016).
240 See Dada, 554 U.S. at 15 (noting the government’s argument that “by requesting
and obtaining permission to voluntarily depart, the alien knowingly surrenders the
opportunity to seek reopening”); see also id. at 23-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Dada “accepted the above described deal, but now . . . wants to back out”).
241 See id. at 21 (majority opinion).
242 See, e.g., id. at 12 (explaining that motions to reopen are a form of “procedural
relief” used by federal judges in immigration cases at least as far back as 1916 and
“later codified by federal statute”); id. at 12-13 (suggesting judicial intervention to
reopen proceedings may not be warranted where noncitizens are not given a “full
opportunity to testify and to present all witnesses and documentary evidence”
(quoting and citing Wong Shong Been v. Proctor, 79 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1935)));
id. at 18 (explaining the motion to reopen as an “important safeguard”); id. at 21
(holding that an alien “must be permitted to withdraw . . . a voluntary departure
request” to protect the right to pursue a motion to reopen).
243 Id. at 18; see also id. at 21 (“We hold that, to safeguard the right to pursue a
motion to reopen for voluntary departure recipients, the alien must be permitted to
withdraw, unilaterally, a voluntary departure request . . . .”).
244 See id. at 18, 22.
239
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reopen, due to a massive agency backlog.245 Therefore, the possibility
that a noncitizen’s motion to reopen would be adjudicated before the
end of the voluntary departure period turns on a matter of “pure
happenstance.”246 Moreover, the Court candidly hoped that
“[a]llowing aliens to withdraw from their voluntary departure
agreements,” would establish a “greater probability that their motions
to reopen will be considered.”247 Finally, the Court found the statute
and legislative history insufficiently clear to permit infringement of
this vital procedural safeguard.248 Dada thus protected a noncitizen’s
opportunity to present a defense to removal even after having accepted
an order of voluntary departure.
Two years later, Kucana v. Holder allowed the Court to further
elaborate on the importance of allowing noncitizens adequate
opportunity to present a defense to deportation. One of IIRIRA’s
restrictions on judicial review provides that no federal court shall have
jurisdiction to scrutinize discretionary agency actions.249 Kucana
presented the question whether federal courts retain jurisdiction to
review denials of noncitizens’ motions to reopen removal proceedings
where the Attorney General — rather than Congress — has committed
such determinations to the discretion of the agency.250 Justice
Ginsburg’s majority opinion, joined by seven Justices, found that
Congress intended to insulate from judicial review only agency
decisions made discretionary by statute, in contrast to those so
specified by administrative regulations.251
Kucana applied for asylum in the late 1990s but was ordered
removed when he failed to appear for his merits hearing.252 He
remained in the country, however, and moved to reopen his removal
proceedings in 2006, alleging that political conditions in his native

245 See id. at 17 (noting that many decisions are pending more than a year before
the BIA).
246 Id. at 17.
247 Id. at 22; see also id. at 30 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What does not appear from
the Court’s opinion, however, is the source of the Court’s authority to increase that
probability [that motions to reopen will be considered] in flat contradiction to the text
of the statute.”).
248 See id. at 14-15 (majority opinion).
249 See Immigration and Nationalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)
(2012).
250 See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 237 (2010).
251 See id. at 237. Justice Alito concurred in the Court’s judgment but would have
resolved the case on narrower grounds, id. at 253 (Alito, J., concurring).
252 See id. at 239-40 (majority opinion).
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Albania had materially worsened.253 The BIA declined to reopen.
Departing from the conclusion of at least six other Courts of
Appeals,254 the Seventh Circuit panel declined to take jurisdiction of
Kucana’s case, holding that the INA bars judicial review of
discretionary administrative decisions, whether so designated by
statute or regulation.255
The Court reversed, invoking the “longstanding exercise of judicial
review of administrative rulings on reopening motions.”256 A motion
to reopen, the Court emphasized, is an important “procedural device
serving to ensure ‘that aliens [a]re getting a fair chance to have their
claims heard.’”257 The Court found insufficient indication in the text
or structure of the INA that Congress intended to eliminate judicial
oversight of such a critical mechanism for equity — especially in cases
like Kucana’s, where the underlying claim for relief (asylum) remains
reviewable.258 As the Court explained, the plain language of IIRIRA
expressly prohibits judicial review of the Attorney General’s
discretionary judgments, but does not mention discretionary decisions
delegated by regulation to immigration agency adjudicators.259
The Court was also troubled that the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation would allow the executive agency “to shelter its own
decisions from abuse-of-discretion appellate court review simply by
issuing a regulation declaring those decisions ‘discretionary.’”260 This
result would be an “extraordinary delegation” of authority, raising
separation of powers concerns along with the possibility of
253

See id. at 240.
See id. at 240-41 n.7 (collecting cases).
255 Id. at 240. The U.S. Solicitor General at the time, Elena Kagan, declined to
defend the Seventh Circuit’s decision and Professor Amanda Leiter of the Washington
College of Law at American University was appointed to defend the lower federal
court ruling. See id. at 241-42.
256 Id. at 237; see also id. (“We take account, as well, of the ‘presumption favoring
interpretation of statutes [to] allow judicial review of administrative action.’” (citation
omitted)); id. at 242 (observing that agency decisions about reopening deportation
proceedings have been judicially scrutinized since “at least 1916” (quoting and citing
Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008))); id. at 251-52 (“Because the ‘presumption
favoring interpretations of statutes [to] allow judicial review of administrative action’
is ‘well-settled,’ the Court assumes that ‘Congress legislates with knowledge of’ the
presumption . . . .’” (citations omitted)).
257 Id. at 248; see also id. at 242, 250 (describing motions to reopen as “‘important
safeguard[s]’ intended ‘to ensure a proper and lawful disposition’ of immigration
proceedings” (quoting and citing Dada, 554 U.S. 1)).
258 See id.
259 See id. at 252.
260 Id.
254
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unreviewable agency injustices affecting individual noncitizens facing
removal.261 Kucana thus continued the Court’s efforts to ensure the
continued availability of procedural vehicles for presenting defenses
and seeking judicial review — mechanisms that took on greater
urgency following Congress’s changes to the INA in the 1990s.262
More recently, Mata v. Lynch required the Court to consider another
challenge to judicial review of noncitizens’ attempt to reopen a
removal order.263 Reyes Mata had entered the U.S. unlawfully. Fifteen
years later, he was convicted in state criminal court of assault, put into
immigration proceedings, and ordered removed. Mata’s attorney filed a
notice of appeal with the BIA, but then failed to file a brief stating
grounds for overturning the removal order. Not surprisingly, the BIA
dismissed the appeal. Mata then obtained new counsel, who filed a
motion to reopen his case with the BIA. The government opposed the
appeal based on Mata’s failure to meet the 90-day statutory deadline
for motions to reopen (he was at least 10 days late).
Mata argued that the prior attorney’s ineffective assistance in failing
to file a brief amounted to an exceptional circumstance excusing the
lateness. Although the BIA agreed it had authority to equitably toll the
filing period due to ineffective representation, it declined to do so
because it discerned no prejudice to Mata’s case from the lawyer’s
deficient assistance. Nor was this a situation, the BIA noted, “that
would warrant reopening” through its sua sponte authority, because
“the power to reopen on our own motion is not meant to be used as a
general cure for filing defects.”264
The Fifth Circuit declined to address the merits of Mata’s equitable
tolling claim. Instead, it construed that claim as a request for the BIA
to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the basis of its
sua sponte authority. Because circuit precedent established that federal
courts lack authority to review the Board’s exercise of sua sponte
power, the Fifth Circuit deemed the relief sought by Mata to be
“categorically unavailable.”265
261 See id. at 252-53; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 315, 316-17 (2000) (arguing that the judiciary employs nondelegation norms to
limit executive rules in certain contexts in part to ensure that restrictions on
individual rights are made by the institution with superior democratic legitimacy,
namely Congress).
262 See Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 77 (observing
that Kucana “builds on the Court’s line of decisions ensuring the judicial review of
removal decisions in the face of increasingly stringent congressional restrictions”).
263 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2151 (2015).
264 Id. at 2153 (quoting the BIA’s decision).
265 Id. at 2155. Amicus appointed to defend the Fifth Circuit’s decision also argued
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The Court reversed, finding the basis for the BIA’s denial of the
motion to reopen to be irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue.266 The
Court emphasized that “as we explained in Kucana, courts have
reviewed those decisions for nearly a hundred years,” a tradition that
Congress left intact in the INA even as it “curtailed other aspects of
courts’ jurisdiction over BIA rulings.”267 Thus, Mata clarified that
federal courts should review motions to reopen even where the agency
has dismissed the motion as untimely.
The Court also chastised the Fifth Circuit for its practice of
recasting motions to reopen based on equitable tolling as a challenge
to the Board’s sua sponte decision, and then declining to exercise
jurisdiction. The Court observed that courts sometimes are permitted
to recharacterize filings, but only to “identify[] a route to relief,”
rather than to “render[] relief impossible.”268 The Court then
described the lower court’s premise that motions to reopen are not
subject to equitable tolling as merely “an assumption.”269 Although
disclaiming any opinion about the merits of the equitable tolling
claim, Justice Kagan observed that, aside from the Fifth Circuit, “all
appellate courts to have addressed the matter have held that the Board
may sometimes equitably toll the time limit for an alien’s motion to
reopen.”270 To the extent that the Fifth Circuit disagrees with every
other federal court about the merits of equitable tolling, the Court
continued, it should not mask this division through legal gymnastics
that clothe the issue in “jurisdictional garb.”271 Justice Kagan
suggested that the Court would be interested in resolving this circuit
split, and hinted in dicta that a noncitizen’s failure to comply with the
statutory deadline to file a motion to reopen may well be subject to
equitable tolling for reasons such as ineffective assistance of
counsel.272
A final second-look case to consider here is Nken v. Holder,273 which
concerned another restrictive statutory provision not at issue in Dada,

that the lower court’s approach was justified because “the INA forbids equitable
tolling of the 90-day filing period in any case, no matter how exceptional the
circumstances.” Id.
266 Only Justice Thomas dissented. Id. at 2150.
267 Id. at 2154.
268 Id. at 2156.
269 Id. at 2155.
270 Id. at 2155-56.
271 Id. at 2156.
272 See id.
273 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009).
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Kucana, or Mata. That statute, enacted as part of Congress’s extensive
amendments to the code in 1996, provides that “no court shall enjoin
the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order” unless the
noncitizen can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
order was “prohibited as a matter of law.”274 In a 7–2 decision
authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court narrowly read the
statutory term “enjoin” to encompass only a noncitizen’s request for
an actual injunction, as opposed to a request for a judicial stay of the
removal order.275 Accordingly, the Court held, lower courts should
apply “the traditional standard” for stays, rather than the INA’s much
more restrictive threshold.276
Notably, the Court’s interpretation of the statute’s meaning rendered
the subsection largely without purpose, because noncitizens seeking
judicial review ordinarily will request stays of removal orders rather
than injunctions. As the Chief Justice acknowledged, “the exact role of
subsection (f)(2)” following the Court’s reading was “not easy to
explain.”277 Nevertheless, the Court found it necessary to read the
clause narrowly in order to preserve noncitizens’ opportunities for full
consideration of their right to remain, in light of the system’s practical
limitations on expeditious review by appellate courts.278 By insisting
on the traditional stay factors for noncitizens seeking review, the
Court maintained a preference for individual balancing and room for
judicial discretion. Those structural preferences enable reviewing
courts to directly consider equitable factors when determining
whether to stay a challenged removal order.
A normative concern lies beneath the procedural surface of these
decisions.279 Especially when considered together, the second-look
cases suggest that the Court is troubled by constrictions of
274 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(f) (2012).
275 Nken, 556 U.S. at 425-26.
276 See id. at 434. The traditional stay factors, the Court observed, are: “(1) whether
the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the
merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
277 Id. at 431.
278 See id. at 421, 432-36.
279 See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 1013, 1018 (2008) (observing that procedural rules often “draw not only upon
substantive assumptions about the probability of particular facts but also normative
judgments about where we want the risk of error in cases to fall”).
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noncitizens’ opportunity to present a defense against deportation, even
after a final order of removal. Some of the cases also evince a concern
with the particular harm caused by inadequate assistance of counsel in
the removal context. With a robust right to reopen proceedings, the
risk that a person will be erroneously deported decreases. On the other
hand, a strong opportunity to reopen increases the risk that a person
will have the opportunity to remain in the United States in the face of
a removal order. Thus, it is notable that the Court’s second-look cases
take account of the realities of the deportation system and preserve
structural opportunities to avoid removal where relief may be
available, even in the face of increasing statutory stringency and at
some presumptive cost to efficiency and administrative ease for the
agency and reviewing courts.280
E. Prolonged Detention
A particularly salient feature of the modern deportation system
involves immigration officials’ sweeping authority to detain
noncitizens pursuant to both discretionary and mandatory rules.281
The Court issued three decisions concerning detention provisions
between 2001 and 2005. Despite the proliferation of immigration
detention and widespread litigation on this issue in lower federal
courts, however, the Court declined to review further challenges to
immigration detention for over a decade. Although the Court’s two
primary decisions in this trio — Zadvydas v. Davis and Demore v. Kim
— created some tension in the law, a critical concurring opinion by
Justice Kennedy in Demore has proven over time to be highly
influential to lower courts tasked with reconciling the two holdings, to
the benefit of noncitizens detained while facing removal. This term the
Court will finally weigh in on these issues again, in Jennings v.
Rodriguez,282 a case that should bring much needed clarity to the
procedural rights held by detained noncitizens in ongoing removal
proceedings. If the Court upholds the Ninth Circuit’s decision,283
280 Cf. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 730 (1975) (“[I]t seems impossible to conceive of a manner of
allocating risks of uncertainty without considering substantive preferences.”);
Martinez, supra note 279, at 1019 (“We presume innocence in criminal trials not
because we think most defendants are in fact innocent, but because of concerns about
limiting government power and a preference for avoiding erroneous convictions even
at the cost of erroneous acquittals.”).
281 See supra Part I.
282 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (granting petition for certiorari).
283 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom.
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many more noncitizens will gain the opportunity to secure release
from detention, significantly facilitating their ability to raise legal and
equitable defenses to deportation.
The discussion begins with Zadvydas v. Davis,284 which was decided
during the same term as St. Cyr.285 Zadvydas concerned the
immigration agency’s prolonged detention of former LPRs who had
been ordered removed. The INA mandates detention for 90 days after
any deportation order in order to effectuate the noncitizen’s physical
removal from the United States.286 The statute also provides authority
to continue detention of noncitizens not removed within the 90-day
period on a discretionary basis.287 The executive branch interpreted
this provision to allow indefinite detention of noncitizens with final
orders who could not be removed, for example where no other
country was willing to take them.288 As a result, some noncitizens
become “unremovables,” confined for years, with no end in sight.289
Zadvydas concerned two such would-be lifers, former-LPRs with
criminal histories.290
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court avoided
the due process problems raised by indefinite detention of the
unremovables by construing the statute to permit continued postorder detention beyond the 90-day period only so long as removal was
“reasonably foreseeable.” The Court found that post-order detention
for six months would not raise constitutional concerns, but held that
noncitizens become eligible for release after such period if they can
show that there is “no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.”291
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
284 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
285 See supra Part II.B.
286 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2012).
287 Id. § 1231(a)(6).
288 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.
289 See, e.g., Lise Olsen, Case Tests the Rights of Immigrants Held in U.S. Jails,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 24, 1999), http://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0524/
p2s2.html.
290 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684-86 (discussing facts of the two plaintiffs in
Zadvydas who could not be removed, one of whom was stateless and the other of
whom was a citizen of a country lacking a repatriation treaty with the United States,
and whom the government had been detaining for years).
291 Id. at 701. The Court rejected the executive’s assertion that continued detention
was necessary to ensure the noncitizens did not endanger the community or fail to
appear at future removal proceedings. Id. at 690-91. The Court arrived at the sixmonth presumptive limit for the reasonableness of post-deportation-order detention
by looking to earlier provisions of the INA, which permitted (but did not require)
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Whether Zadvydas should be considered a victory for liberty
interests depends upon one’s perspective. Viewed through the lens of
criminal or civil detention generally, the Court’s willingness to
insulate the government from judicial scrutiny of the legality of
detention for at least six months would seem shocking.292 Moreover,
even after that point, a rule placing the burden on the detainee to
show that removal is not reasonably foreseeable is out of step with
mainstream norms governing confinement. Normally, it is the
responsibility of the government to justify continuing detention.293
Thus, as others have observed, Zadvydas permits at least half a year of
incarceration without requiring the government to make any
individualized showing of dangerousness or flight risk, a rule that flies
in the face of long-established due process law protecting fundamental
liberty interests.294
In the context of the history of immigration law in the United States,
however, Zadvydas’s interpretation of the statute had a progressive
cast. The Court stepped away from a long line of decisions granting
the government virtually limitless authority to detain noncitizens who
have been determined to have no legal claim to enter or remain in the
United States. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, for example, permitted the
government to indefinitely detain the immigrating spouse of a U.S.
citizen, who by that time had been held for three years at Ellis

post-deportation-order detention for up to 6 months. See id. at 697-98 (citing
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 242(c), 66 Stat. 210, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c),
(d) (1982 ed.)). The Court also found detention limits in similar contexts to be
persuasive. See id. at 700-01 (citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966)
(plurality opinion) (extending right to jury for cases with sentences of six months or
greater), and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (recognizing that
a probable cause hearing provided within 48 hours of arrest is presumed reasonable)).
292 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992) (holding that a Louisiana
statute which permitted indefinite detention of mentally ill individual until detainee
could prove that he is no longer dangerous was an unconstitutional violation of due
process); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty is
the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.”).
293 See generally Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1995) (“The scope of the
detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. . . . It is the State’s
burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable
suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an
investigative seizure.”).
294 See Anello, supra note 24, at 376-83; Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration Detention:
No Turning Back?, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 621 (2014); Cesar Garcia Hernandez, Invisible
Spaces and Invisible Lives in Immigration Detention, 57 HOWARD L.J. 869, 878-79, 88182 (2014) [hereinafter Invisible Spaces].
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Island.295 The Court proclaimed: “Whatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned.”296 A few years later, Shaughnessy v. Mezei characterized
the government’s indefinite detention of a returning noncitizen
deemed inadmissible on undisclosed national security grounds as
“temporary harborage” and “an act of legislative grace.”297 Therefore,
the Court held, such detention was not susceptible to judicial review,
no matter how long the duration, and regardless of the fact that Mezei
had lived in the United States lawfully for many years before being
excluded upon his return from a trip abroad. In simple terms, the
majority did not think Mezei had any statutory or constitutional
rights.298
Justice Scalia dissented in Zadvydas, arguing that Knauff and Mezei
required the Court to reject the unremovables’ challenge to their
detention. Justice Scalia characterized the challenge in Zadvydas as “a
claimed right of release into this country by an individual who
concededly has no legal right to be here.”299 Noting that Mezei “upheld
potentially indefinite detention of such an inadmissible alien whom
the Government was unable to return anywhere else,” Scalia found
nothing to distinguish “an alien under a valid and final order of
removal — which has totally extinguished whatever right to presence
in this country he possessed.”300 In short, Justice Scalia would have
found former-LPRs like those in Zadvydas to possess no constitutional
right to challenge their continued detention. In a separate dissenting
opinion, Justice Kennedy acknowledged the unremovables’
“substantial” right to be free of arbitrary and capricious detention, but
found that existing administrative practices satisfied procedural due
process.301
Following Zadvydas, immigration authorities applied the Court’s
six-month rule to all noncitizens ordered deported after being
apprehended inside the United States, whether or not they had ever
been lawfully present.302 Federal authorities continued, however, to
subject noncitizens attempting to enter the United States to lengthy
detention, including those for whom removal was not reasonably
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
Id.
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953).
See id. at 215.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 703 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 703-04.
See id. at 706, 724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(b) (2016).
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foreseeable. The primary example of this involved some of the Mariel
Cubans, who, after being apprehended by the Coast Guard, had been
paroled into the country pending formal admission decisions. Some
went on to commit crimes, with the result that their parole was
revoked and they were found inadmissible.303 Challenges to the
indefinite detention of these and similarly situated noncitizens
eventually reached the Supreme Court in Clark v. Martinez.304 This
time Justice Scalia authored the majority decision, which held that the
Court’s construction in Zadvydas of the post-removal-order-detention
provision must be applied consistently in all situations, including
those involving noncitizens apprehended at entry.305
Thus, with respect to the detention of noncitizens who have been
ordered deported or excluded but cannot be removed, the Court has
construed the statute to impose a fixed outer limit on immigration
detention. This construction followed from the long-held
understanding that freedom from physical detention “lies at the heart
of the liberty” interest protected by constitutional due process.306
In the 2003 decision Demore v. Kim,307 however, the Court seemed
to backtrack from this recognition in Zadvydas. In Demore, a 5–4
majority rejected a due process challenge to the INA’s mandatory
detention rule brought by an LPR detained during removal
proceedings for six months without a bond hearing. The holding came
as something of a surprise, because every circuit court of appeals to
consider a challenge to the mandatory detention provisions after
Zadvydas had found a due process violation.308
The case sharply divided the Justices.309 Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote for the Court on the due process issue, but the critical fifth vote
303 See Laurie Joyce, INS Detention Practices Post-Zadvydas v. Davis, 79 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 809 (2002).
304 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005).
305 See id. at 378 (“As the Court in Zadvydas recognized, the statute can be
construed ‘literally’ to authorize indefinite detention, or (as the Court ultimately held)
it can be read to ‘suggest [less than] unlimited discretion’ to detain. It cannot,
however, be interpreted to do both at the same time.”); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
710-11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 6-month gloss given the post-removal
detention statute by the majority in Zadvydas in part because the same provision also
governs the detention of arriving aliens excluded at the border).
306 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Traum, supra note 126, at 521-22.
307 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
308 See Anello, supra note 24, at 383 n.117 (citing pre-Demore decisions from the
3rd, 4th, 9th, and 10th Circuit Courts of Appeal finding mandatory detention to
violate due process).
309 Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Part I, which held that the
Court had jurisdiction to review challenges to the mandatory detention provision.
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in support of his ruling on that aspect of the case was provided by
Justice Kennedy, who also wrote a separate concurrence.
The Chief Justice distinguished Zadvydas in two important respects.
First, Zadvydas concerned noncitizens “for whom removal was ‘no
longer practically attainable.’”310 In that situation, continued detention
no longer furthered the purpose underlying confinement. In contrast,
detention during removal proceedings increases the possibility that
noncitizens will be successfully removed if ordered deported.311 Even
more critical for the underlying due process analysis was the Court’s
assessment that detention during removal proceedings is of much
shorter duration than the “potentially permanent” period rejected in
Zadvydas.312 In reaching this assessment, the Court noted governmentprovided data indicating that in most cases removal proceedings were
completed within an average of 47 days, or, in the event of an appeal,
four months.313 More generally, Chief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the
breadth of Congress’s power over immigration rules and noted that
detention has long been recognized as “a constitutionally valid aspect
of the deportation process.”314 The Chief Justice also expounded on
the dangers posed by “criminal aliens” and Congress’s belief that the
INS was unable to remove them without mandatory detention.315
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion acknowledged the important
due process concerns raised by detention and emphasized that the
Court’s ruling was predicated on the understandings that (1)
noncitizens had the right to challenge the government’s assertion that
they fell into a mandatory detention category, and (2) detention
during removal proceedings was generally of a brief duration.316
Justice Kennedy went on to indicate his view that a noncitizen “could

Demore, 538 U.S. at 512, 516-17. Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined Part II,
which found no due process violation. Id. at 512, 517-31. Justice Kennedy joined the
Chief Justice’s opinion in full, but also wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 531
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
310 Id. at 527 (majority opinion).
311 See id. at 527-28.
312 See id. at 528-29.
313 See id. at 529 (“In the remaining 15% of cases, in which the alien appeals the
decision of the Immigration Judge to the Board of Immigration Appeals, appeal takes
an average of four months with a median time that is slightly shorter.”).
314 Id. at 521-23 (citing, inter alia, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) and
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896)).
315 See id. at 518-21 (describing the INS’s “wholesale failure . . . to deal with
increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens” and “near-total inability to remove
deportable criminal aliens”).
316 See id. at 531-33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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be entitled to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight
and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or
unjustified.”317 In a lengthy dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg, offered a full-throated account of the liberty
interests at stake, and excoriated the majority for ignoring decades of
case law cutting the other way, including Zadvydas.318 Justice Breyer
dissented separately.319
A number of commentators have suggested that the differing
outcomes (and tenors) of Zadvydas and Demore reflect the influence of
the intervening September 11, 2001 terrorist attack and its securityfocused political aftermath.320 And in fact, over the long run, Demore
has proven a weaker precedent for executive detention authority than
critics originally feared. Lower federal courts have increasingly
distinguished Demore as limited to a particular set of facts that no
longer mark pre-removal detention. In particular, in rejecting the
challenge to the mandatory detention statute both Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence had
emphasized the relatively short duration of removal proceedings.321 In
317 Id. at 532; see also id. at 532-33 (“Were there to be an unreasonable delay by the
INS in pursuing and completing deportation proceedings, it could become necessary
then to inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect
against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.”).
318 See id. at 543, 560-61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“While there are differences
between detention pending removal proceedings (this case) and detention after entry
of a removal order (Zadvydas), the differences merely point up that Kim’s is the
stronger claim.”).
319 Id. at 576 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
320 See Anello, supra note 24, at 376; Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial
Deference to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343, 365 (David A. Martin &
Peter H. Shuck eds., 2005); Charles D. Weisselberg, The Detention and Treatment of
Aliens Three Years After September 11: A New New World?, 38 UC DAVIS L. REV. 815,
834 (2005) (“One cannot read the language of liberty in Zadvydas and Kim without
concluding that there was a shift in the Court in the two years after Zadvydas — the
two years immediately after September 11.”); see also Susan M. Akram & Maritza
Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving
Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?,
38 UC DAVIS L. REV. 609 (2005); Martinez, supra note 279, at 1071-72 (observing that
federal decisions “in the immediate aftermath of September [11] might be too quick to
uphold [detention] programs that, in a more sober atmosphere several years down the
road, might be found unlawful”).
321 It has recently come to light that the Court’s understanding in Demore of typical
detention times was inaccurate, in reliance on erroneous representations by the
Department of Justice in that litigation. See Letter from Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting
Solicitor Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Honorable Scott S. Harris, Clerk, U.S. Supreme
Court (Aug. 26, 2016), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Demore.pdf. See
infra text accompanying notes 328-30.

2017]

Judging Immigration Equity

1089

contrast, immigration proceedings now average over 500 days in
general, and over 400 days for detained respondents.322 As a result,
lower federal courts have increasingly applied the due process norms
expounded in Zadvydas to situations involving mandatory detention
during removal proceedings, requiring individualized bond hearings
when detention becomes unreasonably long.
In Lora v. Shanaham, for example, the Second Circuit relied on
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Demore and the presumptive
constitutional limit established by the majority in Zadvydas to hold
that noncitizens detained during removal be afforded an individual
bond hearing within six months.323 The court held “there must be
some procedural safeguard in place for immigrants detained for
months without a hearing.”324 Every other circuit to squarely consider
the issue has reached a similar conclusion, although courts have
differed with respect to whether to impose the presumptive six-month
limit.325 Thus, the Court’s rulings in Zadvydas, Demore, and Clark
exerted a somewhat libertarian influence on lower courts adjudicating
due process challenges to immigration detention. Together, the cases
established reasonableness — sometimes defined as a presumptive sixmonth limit — as a benchmark for permissible detention before the
322 See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1072 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that
persons facing detention during proceedings “spend, on average, 404 days in
immigration detention”); Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, TRAC
IMMIGR. (Sept. 2016), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_
proctime_outcome.php (showing average processing time for all removal cases to be
500 days or more in fiscal years 2012–2016, and to exceed 200 days each year since
1999).
323 See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 613-615 (2d Cir. 2015).
324 Id. at 614.
325 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1068, 1090 (finding that “the Court’s holding in
Demore turned on the brevity of mandatory detention” and requiring that bond
hearings be provided at six-month intervals); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d
221, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2011) (relying on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence to hold that
noncitizens detained during proceedings for an “unreasonable” amount of time must
be afforded an individualized bond hearing and finding “no question that Diop’s
detention for three years . . . was . . . a violation of the Due Process Clause”); Tijani v.
Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1249 (9th Cir. 2005) (relying on Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence to hold that noncitizen’s 30-month detention during proceedings
“reached the point of unreasonableness,” requiring an individualized bond hearing);
Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 271 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[C]ourts must examine the facts of
each case, to determine whether there has been unreasonable delay in concluding
removal proceedings.”); Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677 F. Supp. 2d 455, 472, 475
(D. Mass. 2010) (noting the constitutional limits on detention during the removal
process articulated by Justice Kennedy and holding that a 22-month detention
violated due process).
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government must provide an individualized bond hearing or release
the noncitizen.
Notably, this term the Court will once again weigh in on a challenge
to immigration detention. In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Court will have
an opportunity to revisit Demore. In that litigation the Ninth Circuit
upheld a federal injunction requiring DHS to provide bond hearings to
noncitizens in removal proceedings when their detention reaches six
months, with release if determined to not be a flight or public safety
risk.326 The injunction implicates several of the statutory mandatory
detention categories, including noncitizens seeking admission to the
United States and noncitizens with criminal convictions (the same
category at issue in Demore).327 In the fashion of Zadvydas, the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling was statutory, employing the interpretive canon of
constitutional avoidance to read a right to periodic review of the
government’s justification for continued detention into the provisions.
There is some basis to suspect that the Court will uphold most or all
of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, or will find an alternative means of
exerting due-process influenced limitations on the detention
provisions. First, as already mentioned, the lower federal courts have
resoundingly endeavored to distinguish Demore in light of the
significantly increased length of detention since that decision was
issued. What is more, it has recently come to light that the
Department of Justice actually misled the Court in Demore regarding
the duration of typical detention times.328 In particular, rather than the
four-months figure for detention where an appeal is taken that was
provided to the Court, it turns out the average length of detention at
that time was in fact 382 days, with a median of 272 days.329 As
discussed above, this government-generated data regarding the alleged
brevity of detention during removal proceedings appeared to have
persuaded Justice Kennedy to join the Court’s holding and provide the
critical concurrence in Demore. Thus, although the DOJ’s erroneous
representations may have been inadvertent, the recent retraction
further undermines the rationale of that decision and its value as
precedent.330
326

See Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1078-85.
See id.
328 See Letter to Honorable Scott S. Harris, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, from Ian
Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Re: Demore v.
Kim, S. Ct. No. 01-1491 (Aug. 26, 2016), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/Demore.pdf.
329 See id.
330 On the problem of the Supreme Court’s reliance on unverifiable assertions of
327
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Furthermore, as I have shown in this article, Demore is something of
an outlier in the Court’s deportation jurisprudence over the last fifteen
years, which across the board has aimed to increase noncitizen’s
opportunities to present legal and equitable defenses to removal.
Allowing noncitizens who do not pose a flight risk or danger to secure
release after six months (or at the point when detention becomes
unreasonable, in light of guidelines the Court may issue in Rodriguez)
will significantly further such goals. As the Ninth Circuit noted in its
decision, “many detainees choose to give up meritorious claims and
voluntarily leave the country instead of enduring years of immigration
detention awaiting a judicial finding of their lawful status.”331 For all
these reasons, the Court may well approach Rodriguez with one eye on
the case’s equity-enhancing consequences and the other on the
government hoodwink that helped produced the result in Demore in
the first place.
It bears noting, however, that even if the outcome of Rodriguez is
positive for noncitizens, neither it nor the Court’s earlier detention
cases concern the conditions or the frequency of immigration
detention. A number of commentators have highlighted the significant
hardships for noncitizens and their families that follow from
immigration detention.332 Noncitizens are overwhelmingly held in
highly restrictive conditions that differ little from those endured by
convicted felons; in fact, immigration detainees are often held
alongside criminal inmates in prisons.333 Solitary confinement,

fact by the Office of the Solicitor General, see Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts:
Nken v. Holder, the Solicitor General, and the Presentation of Internal Government Facts,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1600 (2013).
331 Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1072.
332 See Anello, supra note 24, at 367-70; Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done,
supra note 31, at 37-39; Hernandez, Invisible Spaces, supra note 294, at 892-97; Anil
Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 46-47
(2010) [hereinafter Rethinking Detention]; Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to
Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention
Facility — A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 556 (2009); Mark L. Noferi,
Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily
Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 65-66
(2012); see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS: TRANSFORMING THE U.S.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM — A TWO-YEAR REVIEW (2011); DORA SCHRIRO, DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2009).
333 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 332, at i; SCHRIRO, supra note 332, at
4, 21; INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE
UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS 85 (2010); Anello, supra note 24, at 36768; Hernandez, Invisible Spaces, supra note 294, at 893.
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restricted visitation, abuse, and inadequate medical care are
increasingly well-documented.334 A recent report on eleven
immigrant-only contract detention sites found striking medical
neglect, including “critical delays in care” for detainees with “cancer,
AIDS, mental illness, and liver and heart disease,” failures to properly
diagnose patients with “obvious and painful symptoms,” and
widespread use of overworked, underqualified medical workers.335
Furthermore, many detained noncitizens face substantial practical
obstacles to challenging either their removal or their detention,
including the lack of any right (or even access) to counsel, and
disconnection from family and other support networks.336
Even so, the modern Court’s detention cases reflect a break with
longstanding precedent in establishing an outer limit on the time that
the Executive can detain noncitizens without an individualized
hearing regarding the appropriateness of continued confinement. The
Court’s recent jurisprudence thus has yielded (and may further
strengthen, in this term’s Rodriguez decision) an important safeguard
against unreasonably long detentions as a consequence of immigration
violations. These limits are significant in facilitating the ability of
many noncitizens to raise (and win) equitable and legal defenses to
removal.337
334 See, e.g., PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PUNISHMENT BEFORE JUSTICE: INDEFINITE
DETENTION IN THE U.S. 17-18 (2011); Anello, supra note 24, at 368; Hernandez,
Invisible Spaces, supra note 294, at 893-97; Kalhan, Rethinking Detention, supra note
332, at 42, 47; Nina Bernstein, Officials Hid Truth of Migrant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 2010, at A1; Ian Urbina & Catherine Rentz, Immigrants Held in Solitary Cells,
Often for Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2013, at A1; Lisa Graybill, Immigration Detainees
Fear Rape and Death, ACLU BLOG (Oct. 25, 2011), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
immigration-detainees-fear-rape-and-death; Seth Freed Wessler, ‘This Man Will Almost
Certainly Die,’ NATION (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/privatizedimmigrant-prison-deaths/.
335 See Wessler, supra note 334 (reporting that of the 77 medical records
concerning noncitizens who died in detention that contained enough information to
allow a medical judgment, reviewing doctors found that adequate medical care had
been provided only in 39 cases, and contending that detainees are “dying of treatable
diseases — men who very likely would have survived had they been given access to
adequate care”).
336 See Hernandez, Invisible Spaces, supra note 294, at 883, 889 (“Though Zadvydas
represents an important glimmer of judicial oversight of immigration detention, its
impact is rather meager given that detainees are not afforded appointed counsel and
are frequently detained in remote locations that make securing counsel quite
difficult.”).
337 See, e.g., PETER L. MARKOWITZ ET AL., N.Y. IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY,
ACCESSING JUSTICE: THE AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION
PROCEEDINGS 19 (2011), http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/NYIRS_
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III. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
In recent years, the Court has devoted a significant portion of its
shrinking docket to adjudicating disputes that bear on the possibility
of normatively unjust deportations.338 As this Article has
demonstrated, the Court’s deportation jurisprudence recognizes, and
attempts to structure, the critical role that enforcement discretion
plays in the modern deportation system. Across a diverse set of legal
issues, the cases evince a deep concern with the sweep of the statute,
especially with respect to minor offenses leading to removal,
detention, or to the inability to access discretionary relief. Unpacking
all of the implications and drawbacks of the Court’s approach presents
many considerations that I cannot fully address in this article. Here
my primary aim has been to bring some coherence to the Court’s
deportation jurisprudence as a whole, which until now has been
examined in piecemeal fashion. However, a few of the most salient
implications and limitations are readily apparent, and a logical starting
point involves holistically reviewing the practical effects of the Court’s
key rulings on the deportation process, as discussed in Part II.
First, Arizona consolidates immigration enforcement power in
federal officials, insulating discretionary non-enforcement priorities
and choices from uninvited interference by state or local police.
Arizona leaves no doubt that federal immigration officials may decline
to enforce the law in some situations, even when dealing with persons
who, as a matter of formal code law, are removable. Eventually, the
Court may decide whether immigration officials may implement
equity-based non-enforcement decisions on a more generalized
basis.339
Of course, a system that primarily depends on enforcement
discretion to achieve justice channels far-reaching power and
responsibility to a particular set of institutional actors — namely,
agency policy-makers and their front-line enforcement officers and

Report.pdf (reporting study in which only 18% of detained noncitizens with counsel
and 3% without counsel were successful in removal proceedings, in contrast to a winrate of 74% for non-detained (or released) noncitizens with counsel and 13% without
counsel); Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (analyzing 1.2 million deportation
cases to demonstrate that only 14% of detained immigrants were able to secure
representation and that immigrants with attorneys were five-and-a-half times more
likely to obtain relief from removal).
338 On the contraction of the Court’s docket, see Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon,
Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012).
339 See infra Part III.B.
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prosecutors. Immigration-enforcers, however, may not always be best
suited to determine with accuracy which cases warrant the exercise of
equitable discretion.340 Worse yet, consolidating power in the
executive could result in a constriction of equitable decisionmaking.
The risks that executive officials might fall short in injecting justice
into the immigration system thus may have played a key part in the
modern Court’s many process-centered decisions, the overarching
thrust of which aim to protect noncitizens’ liberty interests.
To recap, Padilla ensures that a noncitizen who faces criminal
charges will be aware of the immigration consequences that attach to
various dispositions of the case, and encourages equity-based
bargaining to avoid normatively unjustified deportations. The
categorical approach and anti-retroactivity procedural cases work in
conjunction with Padilla to facilitate strategic plea-bargaining and to
keep open post-conviction possibilities for equitable relief. Judulang
also suggests a restraint on immigration charging decisions that would
arbitrarily preclude the possibility of equitable relief, and, more
broadly, emphasizes the need to link enforcement actions to a
normative evaluation of a noncitizen’s fitness to remain in the United
States. The second-look cases safeguard the ability of noncitizens to
reopen removal cases, particularly when there is new evidence bearing
on a defense to deportation or when the removal order stems from
deficient attorney conduct. Finally, the detention cases impose outer
limits on government authority to confine noncitizens — limits that
depart sharply from more deferential principles previously embraced
by a majority of the Court.341
Viewed holistically, the cases suggest that the modern Court
believes that factors such as a noncitizen’s presence in, connections
with, and contributions to the United States, along with other
mitigating factors (such as youth or the passage of time), should be
balanced against the gravity of the immigration or criminal violation
in order to evaluate whether deportation is warranted in individual
cases. Thus, across the board, the Court’s recent deportation
jurisprudence appears to be guided by some kind of a proportionality
principle, even though it has never directly articulated that principle,
and may never do so. Some of the decisions directly concern the ratio
between the underlying offense and the gravity of the sanction, while
340 See, e.g., Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done, supra note 31, at 46-54
(explaining why front-line immigration agents have difficulty consistently exercising
equitable discretion).
341 See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 227-28
(1953).

2017]

Judging Immigration Equity

1095

others aim to facilitate equitable claims, many of which are statutebased. The remainder of this Part elaborates on a few of the
implications and drawbacks of the Court’s approach to the
implementation of equity concerns in the deportation system.
A. Crime and Status
As both a legal and practical matter, modern immigration
enforcement against noncitizens is closely tied to criminal history.
Many commentators have discussed the executive branch’s
enthusiastic implementation of the criminal detention and removal
provisions enacted by Congress in the 1990s.342 In Ingrid Eagly’s
words, “federal immigration enforcement has become a criminal
removal system.”343 Indeed, the theme of executive decisionmaking in
this area has been that criminal history, no matter how minor, is
treated as an almost irrefutable signifier of undesirability.
The present-day Court, however, has taken a different tack. Since
the 2001 ruling in St. Cyr, the Court has repeatedly scrutinized the
immigration system’s tight linkage of criminal behavior and
deportation. The Court’s decisions demonstrate that it believes
consideration of the normative justifiability of deportation to be
appropriate even where the noncitizen has a criminal history. Its
categorical approach and related criminal deportation rulings, for
example, dilute the otherwise little-restrained power of immigration
officials to remove noncitizens on the basis of minor criminal
convictions. These decisions indicate that the Court takes seriously
the principle that severe penalties imposed on the basis of criminal
convictions should be predicated on a more individualized
consideration of equities.344 On the other hand, this does not mean
that the Court’s proportionality concerns only inure to the benefit of
noncitizens with criminal history. In Torres, for example, a majority of
342 See, e.g., Das, supra note 132, at 1725 (“[E]nforcement of all of these criminal
grounds is rapidly expanding. The temptation for immigration officials to continue to
erode categorical analysis in order to give more life to various removal provisions is
great.”); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the
Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 651-52 (2004)
(“[W]e live in a time of extreme ‘vigor, efficiency, and strictness’ as to deportation of
non-citizens convicted of crimes, due to nearly two decades of sustained attention to
this issue.” (footnote omitted)); Koh, supra note 131, at 307.
343 Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens, supra note 80, at 1128.
344 Cf. Bowers, Baselines, supra note 17, at 1089 (arguing that the Court’s recent
criminal plea-bargaining cases “may even have subtly laid the foundation for a weak
version of what I consider to be the proper baseline — a normative baseline grounded in
an entitlement to proportional punishment” (emphasis in original)).
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Justices was willing to depart slightly from the Court’s general
insistence on a strict categorical approach to analyzing immigration
consequences of criminal convictions, in order to avoid a statutory
interpretation that it perceived would allow very serious offenders to
more easily avoid deportation.345 The Court’s primary concern appears
to be with the extreme harshness of the statutory provisions enacted in
the 1990s, and in particular with the possibility of balancing in cases
involving persons with relatively minor convictions.
Additionally, a handful of the Court’s decisions address the weak
procedural protections afforded to noncitizens in immigration
proceedings, supplementing its efforts to ensure that disproportionate
consequences do not accompany minor convictions. In these ways, the
Court has emerged as the sole federal branch willing to protect
deportable noncitizens with criminal history.
The Court’s deportation holdings also benefit noncitizens present in
the United States without authorization or any formal path to lawful
status. Arizona provides the most direct example, since Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion explicitly acknowledged that the ruling
will allow federal immigration officials to forgo removal proceedings
against undocumented noncitizens.346 Eleven million undocumented
persons live in the United States, and the vast majority of those
individuals have been here for over a decade.347 As the Court
recognized in Arizona, many of these persons will have formed
families and other community bonds that make deportation
“inappropriate.”348
Padilla’s Sixth Amendment rule likewise works to the benefit of
undocumented noncitizens. It is well-accepted that the Constitution’s
criminal trial procedural protections are not contingent upon
immigration status.349 Severe immigration penalties such as detention,
345 See supra text accompanying notes 204–11; see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557
U.S. 29, 40 (2009).
346 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (“Returning an
alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed
a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission.”).
347 See Jeffrey S. Passel & D’vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Stable
for Half a Decade, PEW RES. CTR. (July 22, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/07/22/unauthorized-immigrant-population-stable-for-half-a-decade/.
348 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2499; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 202 (1982) (striking down as unconstitutional a Texas statute denying public
education to undocumented children).
349 See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); Daniel A.
Horwitz, Actually, Padilla Does Apply to Undocumented Defendants, 19 HARV. LATINO L.
REV. 1, 30 (2016). But see César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Padilla v. Kentucky’s
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ineligibility for discretionary relief, truncated removal procedures, and
lengthy or permanent bars on lawful return, automatically attach to
convictions whether or not a defendant is already deportable for
unlawful entry or unlawful presence.350 Therefore, to provide
constitutionally adequate assistance, defense attorneys must advise
their undocumented clients about such consequences. Moreover,
Padilla’s equitable function of promoting plea-negotiation strategies
that take deportation into account will carry over to cases involving
unlawfully present noncitizens.351
The results of the categorical approach similarly do not turn on the
immigration status of the noncitizen. Categorical analysis works to
keep certain convictions from being deemed particular removal
offense categories, for example the aggravated felony categories.
Aggravated felonies disqualify undocumented noncitizens from
cancellation of removal or asylum.352 Aggravated felonies can also
result in expedited “administrative removal” proceedings for
undocumented noncitizens, with even fewer procedural rights than
are provided by regular immigration courts.353 Finally, and most
importantly, aggravated felonies result in a permanent bar to lawful
return. Thus, by limiting the convictions that can be deemed
aggravated felonies, the application of the categorical approach clearly
can benefit the undocumented even if they remain deportable solely
on the basis of unlawful status. In like fashion, the second-look and
detention cases impact noncitizens facing removal who lack lawful
immigration status.354
Inapplicability to Undocumented and Non-Immigrant Visitors, 39 RUTGERS L. REC. 47, 48
(2012) (arguing that Padilla’s Sixth Amendment rule does not apply to criminal
defendants who are not LPRs).
350 See Cade, Plea Bargain Crisis, supra note 31, at 1809-10; Michael J. Wishnie,
Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 415, 445
(2012).
351 See text accompanying supra notes 132–39, and infra note 349.
352 See Immigration and Nationalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i)
(2012) (aggravated felony is “particularly serious crime” precluding asylum); id.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(C) (aggravated felony precludes cancellation of removal for non-LPRs).
Convictions classified as crimes involving moral turpitude can also preclude non-LPR
cancellation of removal in some circumstances. See Cortez, 25 I.&N. Dec. 301, 311
(B.I.A. 2010) (holding that a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude bars
undocumented noncitizens from seeking cancellation of removal if the offense carries
a potential sentence of one year or more).
353 See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(1)–(2); Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note
18, at 673; Wadhia, supra note 231, at 2-3.
354 See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005) (holding that a statutory
provision cannot be given different meaning depending on the immigration status of
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We should not miss the significance of this expansive conception of
which persons have some claim to continued presence that the Court
believes is appropriately evaluated prior to the imposition of
banishment. In a seminal article on the modern convergence of
criminal law and immigration enforcement, Juliet Stumpf observed
that “at bottom, both criminal law and immigration law embody
choices about who should be members of society: individuals whose
characteristics or actions make them worthy of inclusion in the
national community.”355 While criminal law strips elements of
membership from serious offenders, immigration law acts as a fence
around membership, admitting only those noncitizens who can clearly
establish their right to pass through the gate.356 Many millions of
undocumented noncitizens in the United States lack any path to
lawful status, perpetually fenced out from full inclusion. But the
Court’s conception of potential claims to membership, or at least some
of its aspects, is broader and more inclusive than formal code law,
which presumes non-membership.357 In this sense, the Court’s
understanding of immigration law and membership appears to overlap
with a theory of inclusion that Hiroshi Motomura has described as
“immigration as affiliation.”358 Under this view, immigration law
should acknowledge and account for immigrants’ family ties and
community contributions in this country.359 Because current code law
provides insufficient mechanisms for adjudicative consideration of
the person being detained).
355 Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 397 (2006).
356 Id. at 399-400; see Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, & the Difference that
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (1994); Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing
Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 157-58 (1999).
357 The Court’s conception of undocumented children as deserving at least some of
the protections afforded by U.S. society membership, despite their deportability, was
also present in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
358 MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 110-11.
359 This way of understanding the Court’s recent immigration jurisprudence also
helps explain why it is less solicitous with respect to due process challenges to visa
admission denials, which typically involve noncitizens yet to build significant equities
in the United States. See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 135 (2015); see also Linda
Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 389 (2007) (articulating “ethical territoriality,” the idea that physical
presence within the United States gives rise to rights and recognition); Geoffrey
Hereen, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the
United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367 (2013) (discussing the distinction
between insiders and outsiders with respect to rights); Daniel I. Morales, Immigration
Reform and the Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 49 (2013) (same).
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affiliation circumstances, the Court has endorsed the weighing of such
factors through upstream discretionary enforcement decisions and
criminal court negotiations. It has also reinforced anti-retroactivity
norms and tools such as the categorical approach, which soften some
of the harshest aspects of the criminal removal provisions.
To be sure, with respect to unauthorized noncitizens the Court’s
solicitude in this regard extends no further than endorsement of
discretionary permission to remain where the equities are strong
enough; the immigration cases do not create new paths to status or
citizenship. Nevertheless, the freedom to stay inside the United States,
still unified with family and community, is arguably the most
fundamental aspect of membership, even if it falls far short of
conferring the status necessary for equal membership. Furthermore,
deportable noncitizens who manage to remain within the United
States as a result of individual or macro enforcement choices are much
more likely to benefit from future developments in law or policy than
those who already have been deported.360
Seen in this light, the Court’s recent immigration jurisprudence
resonates with the representation-reinforcing theory championed by
John Hart Ely.361 As Professor Ely argued, the judiciary has a special
responsibility to protect marginalized and politically voiceless
groups.362 In St. Cyr, the Court explicitly referenced the “political
pressures” that may lead the legislature to target “unpopular groups or
individuals.”363 The Court noted that noncitizens, lacking the right to
vote, “are particularly vulnerable to adverse legislation.”364 The
proportionality principle at work in St. Cyr and other discretionpreserving deportation cases can thus been seen as implementing
“resilient strains of constitutional theory most famously expressed in
‘footnote four’ of United States v. Carolene Products Co.”365 The political
branches, the Court seems to believe, have paid insufficient attention
360 See MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 86 (“The idea of Americans in waiting is an
expectation, held by both a newcomer and those already here, that the newcomer will
belong someday.”).
361 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
181-83 (1980).
362 See id.
363 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315 (2001) (quoting and citing Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994)).
364 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316 n.39 (quoting and citing Stephen Legomsky, Fear and
Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1615 (2000)).
365 See Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1293 (2002).
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to the equitable claims of noncitizens who have convictions, or who
lack resident status, before imposing life-altering immigration
sanctions. The Court’s recent deportation jurisprudence appears
calibrated, within the judiciary’s institutional constraints, to address
that failure.
B. Categorical (Non-)Enforcement Discretion?
This understanding of the Court’s growing solicitude for the
equitable rights of unauthorized noncitizens also has implications for
larger-scale discretionary policies designed to limit the removal of
noncitizens with particularly sympathetic equities, such as those at
issue in United States v. Texas.366 While unique features of the Obama
administration’s efforts to extend deferred action to certain childhood
arrivals and parents of U.S. citizens or Lawful Permanent Residents
complicate evaluation of their legality, the wide scholarly consensus
was that they comprised permissible exercises of enforcement
discretion.367 For present purposes, we may sidestep a full engagement
366 Announced late in 2014, the deferred action programs were soon halted by a
federal lawsuit brought by 26 states or state officials. See David Montgomery & Julia
Preston, 17 States Suing on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014); Alicia Parlapiano,
What Is President Obama’s Immigration Plan?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014). The district
court preliminarily enjoined the rollout of the programs on the grounds that they
amounted to a formal rule that should have been promulgated through notice and
comment procedures. See Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 604, 677 2015 WL
648579 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015). A divided Fifth Circuit panel then upheld the
preliminary injunction, focusing on the categorical nature of the programs, the size of
the pool of persons who might benefit, and the affirmative benefits that flow from the
status of deferred action, in particular employment authorization. See Texas v. United
States, 787 F.3d 733, 778, 794 (5th Cir. 2015). Pursuant to the laws or policies of
some states, deferred action and/or federal employment authorization enables access
to state drivers’ licenses, which is what the states asserted as their primary injury in
the lawsuit. Id. When the government’s appeal reached the Court, the Court issued a
one-sentence per curiam decision, which indicated that its eight members were
equally divided, thereby affirming the lower court’s judgment (although without
further precedential effect). See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
Subsequently, the Court rejected the administration’s motion for rehearing once a
ninth Justice is confirmed, returning the matter to proceed in the District Court. See
Petition for Rehearing, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (July 18, 2016) (No.
15-674), 2016 WL 3902439, reh’g denied, (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.
gov/orders/courtorders/100316zor_9ol1.pdf.
367 For a sample of recent scholarship arguing that the deferred action programs
were constitutional, see MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 147; Cox & Rodriguez, Redux,
supra note 29, at 104; Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in
the Absence of Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 256 (2013); Kalhan,
Deferred Action, supra note 83, at 85; Shoba S. Wadhia, The President and Deportation:
DACA, DAPA, and the Sources and Limits of Executive Authority – Response to Hiroshi
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with the constitutionality of DAPA and DACA in particular, instead
focusing on the extent to which such efforts generally align with the
Court’s recent deportation jurisprudence.
Bracketing the question of their ultimate legality, it seems
abundantly clear that the deferred action programs were an instance of
equity-driven enforcement discretion, aimed at implementing some of
the Department of Homeland Security’s proportionality concerns in
the face of code stringency.368 In particular, the criteria for DACA —
long-term residence in the United States, entering the country at a
very young age, earning a high school diploma, lacking a criminal
record and other “red-flag” markers of antisocial behavior —
illustrates some of the inflexibility and harshness of the current code,
which provides few formal mechanisms for such persons to one day
regularize their immigration status.369 For those who qualified for
DACA, entry or presence in the United States without authorization
was the offense triggering the sanction of deportation and a ten-year
bar on lawful return.370 Even so, the mitigating factors built in to the
program’s criteria suggested at least significantly diminished personal
culpability, strong community ties, assimilation as Americans, high
potential for economic productivity, and no indications of criminality
or dangerousness. The criteria for DAPA, which would have benefited
the law-abiding, long-present parents of U.S. citizens or LPRs, also
reflected the Obama administration’s concern with unjustly imposing

Motomura, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 189, 192 (2015); Letter from 136 Law Professors and
Scholars to President (Sept. 3, 2014), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/LawProfessor-Letter.pdf. For opposing scholarly views, see Robert J. Delahunty & John C.
Yoo, Dream on: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the
DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 785-77 (2013); Peter
Margulies, Take Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105, 106 (2014); Zachary S.
Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 680 (2014);
Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism, supra note 69, at 84.
368 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 685-86, 694-98.
369 See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/considerationdeferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last updated Aug. 10, 2016).
370 See Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A)–(C)
(2012) (providing that noncitizens who were inadmissible at the time of entry, or who
are present in violation of the INA, or who fail to maintain or comply with the
conditions of non-immigrant status, are deportable); id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (setting
forth a ten-year bar on reentry of noncitizens who are removed or who depart the
United States after having resided without authorization for at least one year).
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the life-altering penalty of deportation in light of certain noncitizens’
underlying conduct and personal circumstances.371
These kinds of deferred action programs would exempt (at least
temporarily) from enforcement deportable noncitizens who can point
to highly sympathetic equities, focusing in particular on situations that
implicate the well-being and diminished culpability of children. To be
sure, the scale of those who might have benefited from DACA and
DAPA combined — estimated at a combined five million, or nearly
half the entire undocumented population — was fairly breathtaking.372
In the view of some commentators, the categorical nature of the
programs was at odds with traditional notions of individualized
equity.373 Others countered that the deferred action programs’ design
merely “relocate[d] discretion to a point higher up in the
bureaucracy,”374 that low-level agents retained adequate discretionary
power in evaluating DACA applicants,375 and that in any event the
large number of potential beneficiaries simply reflected the fact that a
large number of removable noncitizens in the United States have
extremely sympathetic equities.376 Ultimately, the take-away for
present purposes is that these efforts were driven by the Obama
administration’s perceived need to exercise consistent discretion in
immigration enforcement, rooted in equitable concerns about the
proportionality of deportation.

371 See JEH CHARLES JOHNSON, SEC’Y U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISING
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME TO THE UNITED
STATES AS CHILDREN AND WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE THE PARENTS
OF U.S. CITIZENS OR PERMANENT RESIDENTS (2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf. The administration justified
DAPA in part because American-born children will eventually be able to lawfully
petition for their parents; therefore, offering prosecutorial discretion to the lawabiding persons within that group would avoid unnecessary destruction of the family
unit. See Brief for the Petitioners, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (Mar. 1,
2016) (No. 15-674), 2016 WL 836758, at *62.
372 See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 3, at 3-4.
373 See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 367, at 177; Michael W. McConnell, Opinion,
Why Obama’s Immigration Order Was Blocked, WALL STREET J., Feb. 18, 2015, at A15;
Zachary Price, Two Cheers for OLC’s Opinion, BALKANIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/two-cheers-for-olcs-opinion.html.
374 See Cox & Rodriguez, Redux, supra note 29, at 182; Kalhan, Deferred Action,
supra note 83, at 90; see also MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 205; Amanda Frost, When
Two Wrongs Make a Right: Response to Hiroshi Motomura, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 101
(2015).
375 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 695-96.
376 See id. at 696-98; Kalhan, Deferred Action, supra note 83, at 70, 92; see also
MOTOMURA, supra note 11, at 176.
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In light of President-elect Donald Trump’s signaled end to the
Obama administration’s deferred action initiatives, it is unlikely that
Texas or associated litigation377 will return to the Court. Thus, the
scope of the President’s authority to implement such equitable
administrative efforts will remain uncertain for the time being.
Arguably, however, such efforts are consistent with Arizona, where the
Court acknowledged that federal enforcers may appropriately decline
to enforce code law against deportable noncitizens, including as a
result of general enforcement priorities. The Court did not predicate
its preemption rulings on the necessity that enforcement discretion
actually be exercised in any particular individual’s case. Indeed, the
vast majority of those protected from state action by Arizona will have
avoided federal enforcement as the result of macro-level enforcement
policies and resource decisions, rather than due to any form of caseby-case equitable balancing. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Arizona
explicitly recognized the connection between the majority’s
endorsement of broad executive authority to under-enforce
immigration law and the Obama administration’s then-recent
announcement of DACA.378
Further, the large body of deportation jurisprudence considered in this
Article reflects the Court’s significant pushback, within its institutional
constraints, against the most unfair applications of a deportation system
lacking back-end proportionality review. The intended beneficiaries of
DACA and DAPA would seem to have fit that bill.379
C. Surrogates and Signals
While proportionality concerns appear to underlie the modern
Court’s deportation decisions, thus far the Court has been unwilling to
377 DACA-eligible noncitizens challenging the nationwide scope of the preliminary
injunction in the Texas case have filed complaints in other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Complaint, Lopez v. Richardson, No. 1:16-cv-09670 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2016);
Complaint, Vidal v. Baron, No. 1:16-cv-04756 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016) 2016 WL
4524062.
378 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for insulating from state interference the federal government’s
failure “to enforce the immigration laws as written” and connecting DACA with the
Court’s elevation of enforcement discretion to the status of law for purposes of
preemption analysis).
379 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 698 (“Noncitizens
who meet the criteria for these programs — law-abiding and productive childhood
arrivals or parents of U.S. citizens or LPRs — are likely to be among the portion of the
deportable population presenting the greatest normative challenge to the operation of
the removal system.”).
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invalidate substantive immigration laws or overturn individual
outcomes on proportionality grounds. The categorical approach cases
do mitigate the harshness of the aggravated felony provisions by
rejecting broad interpretations of the criminal removal grounds.380 In
this way, as a practical matter many of the cases do have a substantive,
proportionality-enhancing effect.381 But for the most part the Court’s
decisions rely on procedural and structural tools to inject the
possibility of equitable balancing into the criminal justice and
immigration enforcement systems.382 These procedural safeguards
thus function as surrogates for, or enablers of, fairness and
proportionality, rather than providing specific guidance about what
might make any particular deportation unjust.383
One possible consequence of the Court’s non-substantive approach
in this regard is that the deportation system in the future could
become even harsher and more inflexible.384 The rulings only tend to
create conditions that make the exercise of equitable balancing more
likely.385 Judicial review is limited to assessing whether procedural
requirements were adhered to; the Court does not directly evaluate the
substantive outcomes generated by equitable balancing.386 As a result,
Congress could amend the INA to squelch equitable relief more
380 See Traum, supra note 126, at 525 (“In Leocal, the Court’s ‘ordinary’ and
‘natural’ reading of the statute was not merely procedural, as it yielded a substantive
result: it limited the scope of the aggravated felony definition and meant that a class of
noncitizens would not be subject to permanent exile.”).
381 See id. at 530 (“As a result of Lopez and Carachuri-Rosendo, many low-level drug
offenses do not qualify as aggravated felonies.”).
382 Of course, process is critical. See, e.g., Shaugnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Procedural fairness and regularity
are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if
they are fairly and impartially applied.”); Martinez, supra note 279, at 1026-27
(discussing social science work showing that perceptions of fairness depend on
process as well as substantive outcomes). However, well-designed procedure may also
distract from failure to provide substantively fair outcomes. See generally id.
383 Cf. Koh, supra note 131, at 300 (arguing that the categorical approach “operates
as a proxy for the availability of relief from deportation and corrects for the lack of
proportionality in the laws”).
384 See, e.g., Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, supra note 67, at 77
(“Congress, of course, could intervene to foreclose judicial review of motions to
reopen, but has not yet done so.”).
385 Cf. Bowers, Baselines, supra note 17, at 1112-13 (discussing a similar
phenomenon in the Court’s approach to criminal law plea-bargaining).
386 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 n.38 (2001) (“Moreover, this case
raises only a pure question of law as to respondent’s statutory eligibility for
discretionary relief, not, as the dissent suggests, an objection to the manner in which
discretion was exercised.”).

2017]

Judging Immigration Equity

1105

emphatically (for example, by making any criminal conviction an
automatic basis for deportation), and the executive could throw
discretionary enforcement leniency decisions to the wind.387
The Court may have substantial reasons for declining to recognize a
substantive proportionality right in this context. For example, the
Court might wish to afford the political branches leeway to facilitate
rapid deportation in particularly sensitive cases or in particularly
exigent circumstances. The Court also may wish to avoid the flood of
proportionality-based challenges to removal that would undoubtedly
follow recognition of anything approaching a substantive right. And in
any event, the Court’s approach to proportionality concerns in other
areas of the law — most notably criminal law — is similarly heavy on
process and light on substance.388
Perhaps, then, the Court’s decisions in this area are best viewed as
signals to the political branches that specific aspects of the system are
in need of reform.389 In particular, the Court seems to be messaging,
and with some urgency, that more room for individualized evaluation
is critical for adequate protection of noncitizens’ interests when facing
deportation. While the judiciary is not institutionally situated to create
a humane deportation system, the Court can fire shots intended to jolt
the political branches into the process of statutory or regulatory
reform, if only piecemeal.390 After all, executive officials and
387 Even in that scenario, the Court might at least continue to police overtly
discriminatory or arbitrary and capricious executive enforcement practices. See
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (observing that plaintiffs could
bring an as-applied discriminatory challenge to the operation of SB 1070 in the
future); Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 481-82 (2011); Reno v. AADC, 525 U.S.
471, 510-11 (1999); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 1657-58 (1985). But the
Court’s reliance on procedural rather than substantive holdings puts it “in an
institutionally weaker position to later strike down Congress’s fix on rights-based
grounds.” Martinez, supra note 279, at 1030; see also id. at 1031 (arguing that
procedural rulings can have negative impact on substantive rights because they allow
rights violations to continue and foreclose rights-based challenges in the future
without the merits ever being considered).
388 Cf. Bowers, Baselines, supra note 17 (“The Court has exercised a kind of quality
control over the procedural mechanisms of ‘the machinery of criminal justice.’ But it
consistently has refused to exercise quality control over the substantive penalties that
plea bargains produce.”).
389 Cf. Martinez, supra note 279, at 1029 (“The Court’s [enemy combatant]
decisions are less like landmarks and more like small signposts directing the traveller
to continue toward an eventual, more significant fork in the road.”).
390 See Coenen, supra note 365, at 1366 (discussing inter-branch constitutional
dialogue); see also Michael McCann, How the Supreme Court Matters in American
Politics: New Institutionalist Perspectives 63, 71-73, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Gillman & Clayton eds., 1999)

1106

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:1029

legislatures have duties to act constitutionally (and, arguably,
proportionally), regardless of the judiciary’s willingness or ability to
fully enforce these obligations.391
Ideally, the Court’s deportation jurisprudence would stimulate
Congress to amend the underlying rules, rolling back the breadth and
severity of the removal grounds and detention, and rules returning
broader adjudicative discretionary authority to immigration judges.
These developments would decrease pressure on the executive to seek
proportionality through unusual (and more controversial) measures,
such as President Obama’s deferred action programs. As a result of
political gridlock in this area, however, Congress has not been able to
enact meaningful immigration reform for many years, despite many
attempts.392
If Congress is unwilling or unable to enact statutory amendments
along these lines, the Court’s deportation cases suggest that executive
officials must work harder to inject proportionality into the system
through enforcement discretion and policy choices. In particular, the
Court has tried to impart the message that immigration officials are
taking too stringent a line with respect to noncitizens with criminal
history, by pushing for over-expansive interpretations of the removal
provisions and treating almost any conviction as an unchangeable
mark of undesirability.393 Thus far, however, even direct rebukes from
the Court have not stemmed the tide of cases challenging the
executive’s aggressive approach to deporting longtime lawful
permanent noncitizens with minor convictions.394
(describing how the Court’s decisions can act as a catalyst for political action).
391 See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES 84-92 (2004); Cade, Policing
the Immigration Police, supra note 31, at 189-96; Russell M. Gold, Beyond the Judicial
Fourth Amendment: The Prosecutor’s Role, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1591, 1591-92 (2014);
Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1189, 1225 (2006); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the
Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 128–30 (1993).
392 See MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY SINCE
9/11: UNDERSTANDING THE STALEMATE OVER COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM 1
(2011); Ryan Lizza, Getting to Maybe: Inside the Gang of Eight’s Immigration Deal, NEW
YORKER (June 24, 2013).
393 See supra Part II.B.2; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Torres v.
Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016) (No. 14-1096) (Scalia, J.: “I don’t understand. Your
argument is we have to interpret this thing to be as expansive as possible?”); Cade,
Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 18, at 700-02; Traum, supra note 126, at 528
(arguing that the categorical approach cases “seem[] to caution against expansive
interpretations”).
394 See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2013) (noting that for
“the third time in seven years” the Court has rejected immigration officials’
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CONCLUSION
The decline of equity-based decision-making in regard to
deportation has shaped the Court’s recent jurisprudence in this field.
After a century of extreme deference to the political branches, the
Court has increasingly scrutinized the modern deportation regime’s
lack of equitable individuation, especially regarding noncitizens with
criminal history. The cases appear to represent a comprehensive,
institutional response to an underlying sea change in the statutory and
enforcement background.
But the Court’s procedural approach to regulating proportionality in
the operation of the deportation system has many drawbacks. Because
the Court has not recognized a substantive proportionality principle in
this area, immigration law may continue to address equitable
considerations in only an indirect and incomplete way through
unusual (and often controversial) executive efforts and episodic
ameliorative rulings handed down by the Court. If the Court intends
the deportation cases to signal the political branches that specific
reform is needed, thus far the message has not been received, or at
least not acted upon. In the absence of significant legislative or
executive changes in this area, we can expect the Court to continue to
keep a steady diet of deportation cases on its docket, chipping away at
the harshest edges of a system marked by insufficient consideration of
justice and humanity.

characterization of “a low-level drug offense as ‘illicit trafficking in a controlled
substance’”).

